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Note
SAND WARS: Mineral Reservation Policies Lead
the Supreme Court to Determine Whether Sand Is a
Valuable Mineral in the Nevada Desert
James L. Ryan*
Even the most enterprising settler could not have sold sand in the
desert. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The area surrounding Las Vegas, Nevada is one of the fastest
growing regions in the United States. 2  In fact, studies have indicated
that Las Vegas has grown so quickly that the average home value rose
52.4% in 2004 alone.3  Such tremendous growth indicates one
undeniable fact: a great construction demand now exists around the city
* J.D., Loyola University Chicago, expected May 2006. I would like to thank the editorial board
of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal whose words of encouragement, attention to detail
and insightful comments have improved the quality of this Note ten fold. I would also like to
thank my family for their patience, support, and most importantly, for pretending to pay attention
as I would discuss the finer points of the federal mining and land use regulatory scheme over the
telephone and at the dinner table.
1. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 n.6 (2004).
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COUNTIES RANKED BY PERCENT CHANGE IN POPULATION: 1990
TO 2000, at 1 (2001), http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t4/tabO4.pdf (indicating
Clark County, Nevada's most heavily populated county that includes Las Vegas and its suburbs,
experienced an 85.6% increase in population between 1990 and 2000, making it the thirteenth
fastest growing county in the United States). Between April 1, 2000 and July 1, 2004, the Census
Bureau also estimates the county has grown an additional 20%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR THE 100 FASTEST GROWING U.S. COUNTIES WITH 10,000 OR
MORE POPULATION IN 2004: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2004 (2005),
http://www.census.gov/popest/counties/CO-EST2004-09.html.
3. Sandra Block, Median Home Price Up 9.1%; Tight Supply Drives Sellers' Markets, USA
TODAY, Aug. 27, 2004, at B-04. Not only has Las Vegas sold an incredible number of homes in
this past year, most of these homes are luxury homes; the median home price in Las Vegas is
$269,900, a figure nearly 47% higher than the national median home price. Id. (noting that the
national median home price is $183,800).
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that prides itself as being "America's Playground." 4 Inflationary prices
accompanied by new home construction are not the only negative result
of rapid urbanization; the construction also brings a great need to
quickly improve infrastructure in order to insure the safety of the
citizens.5 In a desert climate such as Nevada, one such necessity, the
flow of drinkable water, takes on special concern.
6
Historically, the federal government has taken an active role in the
water problems of Las Vegas and Nevada. 7 In 1919, the United States
Congress passed the Pittman Underground Water Act.8 This Act
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to designate certain "non-
mineral" Nevada lands for water exploration. 9 Once these lands were
designated, settlers could obtain permits and drill for water.' 0 However,
the federal government retained rights to all coal and "other valuable
minerals"11 and remained the owner of the vast majority of Nevada
land. 12  In 1933, the Roosevelt Administration realized that a
4. Weekend Edition: Las Vegas: American Boomtown (MSNBC television broadcast Dec. 21,
1999)[hereinafter Las Vegas: American Boomtown]. Las Vegas Mayor Oscar Goodman has gone
on record as stating that at the present rate, a new home is completed in Las Vegas every 15
minutes. Id.
5. Id. Mayor Goodman has also stated the city's rapid growth has required the city to build
new schools at a rate greater than one per month creating a tremendous tax burden. Id.
6. Southern Nevada Water Authority, SNWA: Drought Information,
http://www.snwa.com/html/wr-drought.html (last visited July 30, 2005). On January 1, 2004,
state officials placed Clarke County and the rest of Southern Nevada into a drought alert. Id. In
making its determination, the SNWA cited water levels surrounding Lake Mead, an artificial lake
created by the building of the Hoover Dam, have dropped more than eighty five feet over the past
few years, a figure that the authority does not expect to reverse direction any time soon. Id.
7. See David Getches, Water Wrongs: Why Can't We Get It Right the First Time?, 34 ENVTL.
L. 1 (2004) (discussing the history of federal water regulations in the American West); see also
Bruce Clotworthy, Parched: The Future of the Glen Canyon Dam, 17 UTAH B.J. 8, 11 (Nov.
2004) (comparing the efforts of the Southern Nevada Water Authority and the Hoover Dam with
Utah's efforts with the Glen Canyon Dam); Rudy Verner, Short Term Solutions, Interim Surplus
Guides and the Future of the Colorado River Delta, 14 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 241
(2003) (discussing the need for federal regulations on Colorado River water rights).
8. Pittman Underground Water Act, Pub. L. No. 66-60, 41 Stat. 293-95 (1919), repealed in
part by Pub. L. No. 88-417, 78 Stat. 389 (1964) [hereinafter Pittman Act].
9. Id.
10. Id. Under the Pittman Act, permits were conditional in that "the permittee shall begin
operations for the development of underground waters within six months from the date of the
permit and continue such operations with reasonable diligence until water has been discovered."
Pittman Act § 4, 41 Stat. at 294, repealed in part by Pub. L. 88-417, 78 Stat. 389 (1964).
11. The Pittman Act states in part:
That all entries made and patents issued under the provisions of this Act shall be
subject to and contain a reservation to the United States of all the coal and other
valuable minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right to
prospect for, mine, and remove the same.
Pittman Act § 8, repealed in part by Pub. L. 88-417, 78 Stat. 389 (1964).
12. NATIONAL WILDERNESS INSTITUTE, STATE BY STATE GOVERNMENT LAND OWNERSHIP,
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burgeoning Las Vegas would need a more constant supply of water and
authorized the construction of the Hoover Dam, which not only
provides Las Vegas's electrical power but is also a major source of its
water. 
13
Newton and Mabel Butler received a Pittman Act permit in 1940 for
560 acres of land in Lincoln County, Nevada, some sixty-five miles
from Las Vegas. 14  While the land contained a plentiful and visible
amount of sand and gravel, the Butlers were unable to profit from its
extraction because the City of Las Vegas was still too small and too
distant to make extraction economically viable. 15  By the 1990s, Las
Vegas had expanded sufficiently to make the extraction economically
profitable, and BedRoc Ltd. (BedRoc), along with its predecessor-in-
interest Earl Williams, began extracting sand and gravel from the
patented lands 16 for use in various commercial construction projects. 17
The Interior Department considered this extraction a trespass 18 and
ordered the companies to pay damages. 19 BedRoc and Williams filed a
quiet title action in federal district court, arguing that the government
reserved the rights only to "valuable minerals" under the Pittman Act
and not to the sand and gravel. 20 The district court ruled for the
government, holding that the contested sand and gravel were, as a
http://www.nwi.org/Maps/LandChart.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2004) (stating the federal
government owned 61,548 out of 70,275 acres of Nevada land as of 1995). This represents over
87.6% of the land in Nevada. Id.
13. JOSEPH E. STEVENS, THE HOOVER DAM: AN AMERICAN ADVENTURE 4 (1988).
14. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 179 (2004).
15. Id.
16. Id. The type of patent in this case is a "land patent" which is defined as "an instrument by
which the government conveys a grant of public land to a private person." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 919 (8th ed. 2004). These are of course distinct from types of patents issued by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office to an inventor for "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."
35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2005).
17. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 180-81.
18. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1003 (D. Nev. 1999). The Code of
Federal Regulations states:
The extraction, severance, injury, or removal of timber or other vegetative resources or
mineral materials from public lands under the jurisdiction of the Department of the
Interior, except when authorized by law and the regulations of the Department, is an
act of trespass. Trespassers will be liable in damages to the United States, and will be
subject to prosecution for such unlawful acts.
43 C.F.R. § 9239.0-7 (2005).
19. See generally Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. 295 (1997) (affirming the decision of the
Bureau of Land Management to consider the actions by Earl Williams and BedRoc trespass).
20. BedRoc Ltd., 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1004. Since interests of both BedRoc and Earl Williams
were at stake in the federal court action against the Interior Department, both entities brought suit
as co-plaintiffs. Id. They had joint representation in the matter. Id. at 1002.
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matter of law, "valuable minerals" reserved to the government. 2 1 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision after drawing heavily upon the
statutory text of the Pittman Act, the legislative history of the early
1900s land grant statutes and the Supreme Court decision in Watt v.
Western Nuclear,22 a 5-4 decision issued in 1983 by a bitterly divided
Court regarding another early 1900s land grant statute.
23
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 24  In a 6-3
decision, the Court overturned the Ninth Circuit by concluding sand and
gravel did not constitute "valuable minerals" under the Pittman Act and
that the Act did not prohibit BedRoc from extracting sand and gravel
from lands designated for water exploration. 25  In support of its
conclusion, the Court distinguished Watt v. Western Nuclear and ruled
the statutory text's use of "valuable minerals," as opposed to "all other
minerals" used in the Western Nuclear land grant statute, made the two
laws distinguishable. 26  In other words, sand and gravel can be
"minerals" but not "valuable."
27
Admittedly, the topic of property rights in sand and gravel is not
glamorous; however, it is an underappreciated issue that bears
enormous consequences for the nation and the legal community as a
whole.2 8 The BedRoc Ltd. decision not only provides a caveat to many
statutes and regulations 29 but also has serious ramifications in the areas
of construction law, 30  environmental law 31  and energy law. 32
21. Id. at 1008 (declaring that sand and gravel are included within the meaning of "valuable
minerals").
22. See 462 U.S. 36, 55 (1983) (holding that gravel is a "mineral" and is reserved for the
government under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act).
23. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 314 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 1587
(2004).
24. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 539 U.S. 986, 986 (2003).
25. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184-86 (2004).
26. Id. at 183 (noting "In Western Nuclear, we had no choice but to speculate about
congressional intent with respect to the scope of the amorphous term 'minerals.' Here, by
contrast, Congress has textually narrowed the scope of the term by using the modifier
'valuable."').
27. Id. (stating that the term "valuable" in the Pittman Act makes it clear that sand and gravel
are not included).
28. See infra Part V (discussing the wide application of the BedRoc Ltd. decision).
29. See State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 817 N.E.2d 76, 82 (Ohio 2004) (using BedRoc Ltd. as a
basis for refusing to infer a statutory requirement because "the General Assembly did not include
a requirement of descriptive facts to support a TEL applicant's sworn statement providing
evidence of imminent danger .... ).
30. See, e.g., FRANCIS AMENDOLA ET AL., CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF STATUTORY
GRANTS, 73B C.J.S. Public Lands § 89 (2004) (discussing the role of statutory language in land
grant statutes).
31. See, e.g., Ashley v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, No. 04-2066, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957 (8th
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Furthermore, given the dramatic urbanization of the western United
States over the past half-century, the decision's impact becomes
increasingly important.
33
This Note not only explores some of these ramifications but also
examines the framework behind the BedRoc Ltd. decision. Part II of
this Note will provide background on the peculiarities of the Las Vegas
situation, the land grant statutes, and the role the courts have played in
the mineral rights debate. 34  Part III will discuss the eleven year court
battle in BedRoc Ltd. from its beginnings in administrative court to the
United States Supreme Court. 35 Part IV will analyze the case and show
that the Supreme Court should have followed the same method of
analysis employed by the four previous bodies evaluating the case and
should have concluded that the sand and gravel were not reserved to the
government but were the property of BedRoc. 36  Finally, Part V will
show the broad reach of this decision, including the role the decision
will play in the politically charged debate of oil exploration in the
Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge.
37
II. BACKGROUND
The development of mineral rights and mineral reservations is a
complicated tale steeped in the traditions of the Wild West.
38
Accordingly, this Part will begin with a history of the American West
and will give special attention to Las Vegas, Nevada, a city with a
prominent role in the BedRoc Ltd. case.39 Then, this Part will discuss
Cir. June 1, 2005) (challenging the financing of an Indian tribe's public improvement project on
dedicated open space); Appellants' Reply Brief at 24, S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of
Land Mgmt., 2004 WL 2466043 (10th Cir. Sept. 16, 2004) (No. 04-4071) (challenging the
decision of the Department of the Interior to give the Utah State Department of Transportation a
right-of-way through public lands on the grounds it violated federal law).
32. See, e.g., Rosette Inc. v. United States, 277 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 878 (2002) (determining whether geothermal steam emitted from a reservoir constituted a
"mineral" for the purposes of reservation).
33. See generally James R. Rasband, The Rise of Urban Archipelagoes in the American West:
A New Reservation Policy?, 31 ENvTL. L. 1, 1 (2001) (arguing for a reform of the Department of
the Interior's reservation policy as the West becomes more populated).
34. See infra Part I (outlining the development of mineral rights law).
35. See infra Part HI (providing a detailed account of the developments in BedRoc Ltd.).
36. See infra Part IV (arguing that the Supreme Court erred in its analysis and decision in
BedRoc Ltd.).
37. See infra Part V (examining the possible implications that the Supreme Court's decision in
BedRoc Ltd. raises).
38. See generally JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY OF PERPETUAL MOTION
(RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE) (1987) (tracing the history and development of the mining laws).
39. See infra Part II.A (illustrating the growth of the American West).
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the land grant and mining laws and their policy rationale in order to
illustrate how mineral reservations normally take place and the potential
problems in defining what constitutes a "valuable mineral."4 Next, this
Part will turn to administrative and statutory law and the methodology
by which courts evaluate administrative and congressional action.
Finally, this Part will examine case law and illustrate that, while a vast
majority of mineral disputes take place in the administrative arena, there
have been significant decisions by the federal courts in defining mineral
reservation rights.
42
A. Manifest Destiny: The Growth of Las Vegas from a Railroad Supply
Stop to America's Playground.
The State of Nevada lies in the heart of the Great Basin, lying
between the Sierra Nevada Mountains on the west and the Wasatch
Mountains on the east.43  These two mountain ranges form a "rain
shadow" over the entire region making Nevada the state with the least
precipitation in the Union. 44 Thus, as America expanded west, any
water source found within the state would almost certainly spawn a
small city.45  Such a water source was found in the early 1800s, and
consequently the city of Las Vegas originally developed as a sto along
the Spanish Trail that ran throughout the West to Los Angeles.4 John
Fremont later ventured into the town in 1844 and set up one of the first
permanent camps in the area.
4 7
40. See infra Part II.B-D (outlining the basics of homestead and mining laws and their
rationale).
41. See infra Part I.E-F (exploring the methodology by which courts review administrative
agency decisions and acts of Congress).
42. See infra Part II.G (discussing the key mineral rights cases leading up to the BedRoc Ltd.
decision).
43. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 179 (2004) (citing 5 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 442 (15th ed. 1985)). The Great Basin is a large and arid region of
the Western United States, roughly between the Rocky Mountains and the Sierra Nevada. See
Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Great Basin, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GreatBasin (last
visited July 24, 2005).
44. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 179.
45. See Las Vegas News Bureau, The History of Las Vegas,
http://www.lvol.comlvoleg/hist/lvhist.html (last visited July 30, 2005) (explaining the history of
Las Vegas from a water stop to its current status as a resort town).
46. Id. The Spanish Trail was a route used in the early 1800s through the American West to
Las Vegas. Id.
47. Id. Today, Fremont Street is one of the busiest in Las Vegas. Id. Parts of the street form
the famous Las Vegas "Strip," a series of large casinos. Id. Fremont also has one of Las Vegas's
major casinos named in his honor. Id. John Fremont was, however, more than simply an
adventurer, and also had a number of "firsts" in the political arena. Three years after discovering
Las Vegas, Fremont was appointed Governor of the California Territory. Wikipedia: The Free
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While Fremont was first followed by a group of Mormons migrating
west from Salt Lake City, the first major expansion of Las Vegas from a
"tent town" to a full city occurred in 1890 when the San Pedro, Los
Angeles, and Salt Lake Railroad Company decided that Las Vegas
should serve as a stop facility along its route.48 The first train departed
from Las Vegas Station bound for Los Angeles in October 1904, and
the city began to boom.49 In 1931, the state legislature responded to a
wave of illegal gambling throughout the state by legalizing the activity
in an effort to raise revenues for the state. Also in the 1930s,
President Roosevelt authorized the construction of the Hoover Dam,
which, to this day, provides much of the electricity and water supply for
the region.
51
While the Great Depression crippled most of the country, Las Vegas
remained insulated through its gaming, construction and rail
industries. 52 The Second World War brought Las Vegas an enormous
opportunity when the United States Air Force decided to train all of its
B-29 fighter pilots at Nellis Air Force Base, located near the city.53
Many of those stationed at the base enjoyed their time so much that they
returned to Las Vegas after their military careers concluded.54 Thus,
following the war, many small casinos not surprisingly sprung up, and
the Las Vegas Strip began to take shape.55  A convention hall was
added in 1959, and soon thereafter, Las Vegas became a full-blown
Encyclopedia, John Fremont, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JohnFremont (last visited July 30,
2005). In 1850, Fremont became the first Senator from the newly established State of California.
Id. In 1856, Fremont became the first candidate from the Republican Party to run for President of
the United States. Id.
48. See Las Vegas: American Boomtown, supra note 4 (describing this event as one of the
most significant in the history of the city).
49. Id. In May 1905, the Union Pacific Railroad, the successor company of the San Pedro,
Los Angeles, and Salt Lake Railroad, auctioned off 1,200 lots in a single day. Las Vegas News
Bureau, supra note 45.
50. Id. Interestingly, the bill's sponsor, Phil Tobin, had no interest in gambling; he was
simply a rancher. Id. Today, gambling revenues comprise 43% of the state's income with more
than 34% of the state's general fund used to finance public education. Id.
51. STEVENS, supra note 13, at 259 (indicating the use of the Hoover Dam as a source of
electricity); UNITED STATES DEPT. OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, Hoover Dam
Chronology, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/hooverdanHistory/articles/chrono.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2005) (indicating President Roosevelt dedicated the dam on September 30, 1935). Congress
initially passed legislation calling for construction of the dam in 1928; however, based on
engineering concerns, construction did not start until 1933. Id. at 4.
52. Las Vegas News Bureau, supra note 45.
53. Id.
54. Las Vegas: American Boomtown, supra note 4.
55. Las Vegas News Bureau, supra note 45. These casinos include the El Rancho Vegas,
which burned to the ground in 1960, the Last Frontier, Club Bingo, and the Thunderbird. Id.
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gambling center.56
Gambling was legalized in Atlantic City, New Jersey in 1978.5' This
development required Las Vegas to consider diversifying its
opportunities. 58  In 1989, Mirage, the first of Las Vegas's "mega-
resorts," opened at a cost of $630 million and featured a tiger habitat, a
dolphin pool, an elaborate swimming pool, a waterfall, and a man-made
volcano that belched fire and water.59  Today, these "mega-resorts"
make up a majority of the Las Vegas strip, which is now home to the
world's largest hotel, the $1 billion MGM Grand Hotel & Resort.60 The
MGM Grand sits on 112 acres of land and boasts 5,005 rooms, a
171,500-square-foot casino, a movie theater, and a 215,000-square-foot,
15,200-seat special events arena for concerts, sporting events and
exhibitions.61 Complexes, such as the MGM Grand and the Mirage,
create both a great need for raw construction materials and the potential
for suppliers to become quite wealthy.
62
B. Land Ownership and Congressional Land Grant Statutes.
The question of who ultimately owns land has been asked throughout
the centuries. 63  European civil law and the British common law
56. Id.
57. ROGER DUNSTAN, A History of Gambling in the United States, in GAMBLING IN
CALIFORNIA (1997), http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/03/Chapt2.html (last visited January 11,
2005).
58. Las Vegas News Bureau, supra note 45.
59. Id. See also Mirage Hotel and Casino, Las Vegas, http://www.mirage.com/ (last visited
July, 30, 2005) (describing the amenities of the Mirage).
60. MGM Grand, http://www.mgmgrand.com/pages/index-flash.asp (last visited July 30,
2005).
61. See Las Vegas News Bureau, supra note 45 (describing the "mega-resort" phenomenon).
Other "mega-resorts" include the Circus Circus Hotel, featuring an amusement park, Treasure
Island, where full-size pirate ships attack a British frigate every day in the hotel's Buccaneer Bay,
and the Excalibur, which boasts court jesters who perform in the castle shaped hotel. Circus
Circus Las Vegas Hotel, http://www.circuscircus.com/ (last visited July 30, 2005); Treasure
Island Hotel & Casino, http://www.treasureisland.com/ (last visited July 30, 2005); Excalibur Las
Vegas Resort Hotel and Casino, http://www.excalibur.comindex2.php (last visited July 30,
2005).
62. Cathy Werbin, All that Glitters, BUILDING SUPPLY HOME CENTERS (Mar. 1994)
(discussing how the enormous opportunity and intense competition has emerged between Las
Vegas contractors for casino contractors). At the time these "mega-resorts" were being
constructed, Earl Williams began to extract sand and gravel on his Pittman Act land for use on
these projects. Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. 295, 297 (1997) (indicating Williams first began
extracting sand in 1993).
63. See Joshua Siefert, The Myth of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 52 UCLA L. REV. 289, 310-22
(2004) (discussing the philosophical justification for original land ownership). Some of the
seminal works on the subject matter include: JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE (Ernest C. Mussner ed., Penguin Classics 1984) (1739-1740); ADAM SMITH, THE
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eventually recognized that property rights originated in the right of
conquest.64 The United States Constitution also recognizes the right of
the sovereign to control property. 65  Early Supreme Court opinions
expressly permitted the federal government to issue land grants to
individuals, even in cases in which others had occupied the land or held
a claim for ownership based on a different land grant.
66
Immediately after separating from the British Crown, the federal
government began transferring vast amounts of public land into private
hands.67 Congress created the General Land Office in 1812 to dispose
of federal lands in the American Midwest and West.68  These
dispositions conveyed land in fee simple absolute6 9 and provided the
grantee with exclusive rights of ownership. 70 Congress passed the Land
Reform Act in 1891 as part of the Progressive Movement's platform
and changed the federal government's policy from a carte blanche
WEALTH OF NATIONS 199 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1960) (1776).
64. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *48. According to Blackstone, the rights
of conquest are based upon "[a] supposition, grounded upon a mistaken sense of the word
conquest; which in its feudal acceptation, signifies no more than acquisition." Id. He stated:
[T]he right of conquest... can mean nothing more, than that, in order to put an end to
hostilities, a compact is either expressly or tacitly made between the conqueror and the
conquered, that if they will acknowledge the victor for their master, he will treat them
for the future as subjects, and not as enemies.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES* 103.
65. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (noting Congress has the power to "make all needful rules
and regulations respecting... property belonging to the United States"); U.S. CONST. amend. V
(providing the government must provide individuals with just compensation if it wishes to
exercise its sovereign right of eminent domain, a central component of the right of conquest).
66. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588-89 (1823) (holding that the
right of conquest allowed the federal government to issue land grants for property occupied by an
American citizen holding the land from a grant by the Piankeshaw Indian tribe); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (recognizing that the Treaty of Paris, which ended the
American Revolutionary War, gave the United States government the right to make property
conveyances like the British Crown).
67. Northwest Land Ordinance of 1785 cited in GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787, 258-65 (1989).
68. See BETSY A. CODY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS CODE 95-599 ENR,
MAJOR FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES: MANAGEMENT OF OUR NATION'S LANDS
AND RESOURCES (1995), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Natural/nrgen-
3.cfm?&CFID=17773691&CFTOKEN=13897435 (discussing the history of the various
government land grant agencies). The General Land Office was an agency within the Department
of the Interior, which helped convey land to the pioneers who first began to settle the Western
United States. Id. In 1946, it was merged with the United States Grazing Service to create the
Bureau of Land Management. Id.
69. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 649 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "fee simple absolute" as an
estate of potentially infinite duration). Occasionally, the term "fee simple absolute" is shortened
to "fee" or "fee simple." Id.
70. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 868 (1999) (discussing early
land grant procedures).
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disbursement policy to a reservation policy in which the federal
government retained interests in public lands." In the 1910s, Congress
enacted two important land grant statutes that had significant
implications in the BedRoc Ltd. case: (1) the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act of 1916 (SRHA) 72 and (2) the Pittman Underground Water Act of
1919. 7 3 These two acts adopted a bifurcated approach to land patents in
which the government issued a patent for surface lands but retained
mineral rights.74  In 1945, Congress passed the Reorganization Act
75
and merged the General Land Office with another agency to form the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM).76
The SRHA allowed settlers to receive special land permits to raise
livestock on public lands.77 In order to qualify for a permit, an entrant
must have resided on the eligible land78 for three years and made
71. Bureau of Land Management, The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976:
How the Stage Was Set for BLM's "Organic Act", http://www.blm.gov/flpma/organic.htm (last
visited July 30, 2005) [hereinafter Bureau of Land Management].
72. Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-290 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-
302 (repealed 1976)) [hereinafter SRHA]. See also infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text
(discussing SRHA); infra Parts I.A-E (discussing BedRoc Ltd.)
73. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the Pittman Act); see also infra notes
82-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Pittman Act); infra Parts ILI.A-E (discussing
BedRoc Ltd.).
74. See Drake D. Hill & P. Jaye Ripley, The Split Estate: Communication and Education
Versus Legislation, 4 WYo. L. REv. 585, 597-601 (2004) (discussing the federal approach to
land grants during the early twentieth century). According to one court, the bifurcation "opened
the surface for immediate agricultural use while preserving whatever mineral potential lay buried
in the subsurface for later development." Rosette Inc. v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1120 (D.N.M. 1999), affd, 277 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 878 (2002).
The Supreme Court stated the law served to allow the government to depart from the common
law and treat minerals as the dominant interest and the surface as a servient interest. Kinney-
Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 504 (1928).
75. Reorganization Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 613 (1945) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§
133y-y16 (2000 & West Supp. 2005)).
76. Bureau of Land Management, supra note 71 (describing the FLMPA as a comprehensive
land regulation statute). The Bureau of Land Management is responsible for managing 202
million acres of land-about one-eighth of the land in the United States-and about 300 million
additional acres of subsurface mineral resources. Bureau of Land Management, BLM Facts,
http://www.blm.gov/nhp/facts/index.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
77. 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (repealed 1976). Under this Act, the government would issue a
permit for up to 640 acres of unreserved, unappropriated "reasonably compact" lands. Id.
(repealed 1976). See also Hill & Ripley, supra note 74, at 597-99 (discussing the permitting and
reservation process in the SRHA); Stephen R. McNutt, Note, Rosette Inc. v. United States: Is the
United States Full of Hot Air When It Comes to Reservation of Geothermal Resources as a
"Mineral?", 8 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 44, 46-47 (2003) (outlining the provisions in
the SRHA).
78. 43 U.S.C. § 292 (repealed 1976). In order for land to be eligible for the SRHA, the
Secretary of the Interior must determine the land is chiefly valuable for grazing and raising crops,
does not contain merchantable timber, irrigation sources and constitutes no more than 640 acres
of contiguous land. Id. (repealed 1976).
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permanent improvements for the purpose of stock raising. 79  Once an
entrant did that, he had to submit final proof to the Interior Department,
which would then issue a final patent.80  Once approved, the
government gave the applicant title to the surface land but reserved its
interest in "all the coal and other minerals in the land.",
81
The Pittman Act, enacted three years after the SRHA, also dealt with
a specific type of land use; however, it contained a slightly different
reservation provision. 82  The Pittman Act focused not on encouraging
the use of land for stock raising, but rather for water exploration. The
Pittman Act onlx included land owned by the federal government in the
State of Nevada and allowed a citizen to receive a permit to engage in
exploratory water drilling. 85 If a speculator were to find a water supply
capable of becoming a source for irrigation, he or she would receive a
640 acre reward from the government. 86  However, the Pittman Act
included a reservation provision for "all the coal and other valuable
minerals. '87  At the time of its enactment, the Pittman Act was
considered largely an experimental measure8 8 and one that essentially
89failed. In 1964, Congress repealed the Pittman Act but left the
79. Id. § 293 (repealed 1976) (stating that "instead of cultivation as required by the homestead
laws the entryman shall be required to make permanent improvements upon the land entered
before final proof is submitted tending to increase the value of the same for stock-raising
purposes").
80. Id. § 292 (Repealed 1976).
81. SRHA, Pub. L. No. 64-290 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 299(a) (2000 & West
Supp. 2005)). The specific listing of coal in the statute does not provide any guidance on what
Congress means by "mineral." See Skeen v. Lynch, 48 F.2d 1044, 1046-47 (10th Cir. 1931)
(stating Congress's intent was simply to clarify the reservation of the government's interest in
coal, as the mineral has received special treatment in other mining and mineral statutes). See also
Watt v. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 44 n.5 (1983) and accompanying text (outlining the provisions
of the SRHA).
82. Pittman Act, Pub. L. No. 66-60, 41 Stat. 293-95 (1919), repealed in part by Pub. L. No.
88-417, 78 Stat. 389 (1964).
83. Compare Pittman Act, 41 Stat. at 293 (stating the purpose of the Act is "to encourage the
reclamation of certain arid lands in the State of Nevada") with SRHA, 39 Stat. at 862 (stating the
purpose of the Act is "to provide for stock-raising homesteads").
84. Pittman Act, 41 Stat. at 293 (1919).
85. Id. "[T]he Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to grant to any citizen... a
permit, which shall give the exclusive right, for a period not exceeding two years, to drill or
otherwise explore for water beneath the surface of not exceeding [2,560] acres." Id.
86. Id. at 294.
87. Pittman Act, § 8, 41 Stat. at 295. Compare id. with supra note 81 and accompanying text
(stating that coal and other valuable mineral deposits are subject to disposal by the United States
in accordance with the coal and mineral land laws in force at the time of disposal).
88. See 58 CONG. REc. H6468, H6468 (statement of Rep. Evans) (acknowledging the
experimental nature of the Pittman Act's attempt to find irrigable water in Nevada).
89. See S. REP. No. 88-1282 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2699, 2699 (stating that
in the forty year life of the Pittman Act, only three farm units were able to be irrigated as a result
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reservation provision in place.90
In 1976, Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (FLPMA). The FLPMA narrowly tailored the charge of the BLM
to include managing public lands and making disbursement of public
land to private parties only in cases where the national interest is
served. 91 This act was also significant because it repealed many of the
Roosevelt land grants, including the SRHA, but left the previously
issued patents unchanged.92 In 1993, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt
issued an order placing a moratorium on the issuance of patents by state
BLM directors. 93  Since then, public land has been used primarily for
the non-consumptive uses of recreation and preservation. 94
C. The "Building Blocks" of Mineral Law
The determination of what constitutes a "mineral" under the mineral
acts has been the source of much consternation amongst judges,95
Interior Department officials,9 6 and legal scholars. 97  This threshold
determination bears great significance because it determines whether
federal mining laws apply and whether the reservation provisions of the
of the water exploration spurred by Pittman Act patents).
90. See Pub. L. 88-417, 78 Stat. 389 (stating "[a]ny valid application for permit under that
Act, on file with the Secretary of the Interior on the effective date of this Act, may be processed
in the same manner as if this Act had not been enacted").
91. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2763 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1782 (2000 & West Supp. 2005)). See also supra note 71 (discussing the SRHA patent regime).
92. See Watt v. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 38 n.1 (1983) (noting the practice of issuing permits
had been suspended by executive action in 1934, but the final appeal occurred forty-two years
later in the FLPMA).
93. Bruce Babbitt, Secretarial Order No. 3163 (Mar. 2, 1993), cited in Randy Hubbard, The
1872 Mining Law: Past Present & Future, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T J. 149, 150-51 (2003).
94. Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation of Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q.
140, 196-98 (1999) (discussing how the need for ecosystem management and biodiversity have
kept to the position that public lands should be held for non-consumptive uses).
95. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530 (1903) (stating the term mineral
is "used in so many senses, dependent upon the context, that the ordinary definitions of the
dictionary throw but little light upon its signification in a given case"); Ozark Chem. v. Jones,
125 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1941) (defining mineral as including only those inorganic substances
with a definite chemical composition); Waugh v. Thompson Land & Coal Co., 137 S.E. 895, 897
(W. Va. 1927) (defining mineral as a comprehensive term including every description of stone
and rock deposit).
96. Compare Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310, 312 (D.O.I. 1910) (holding
gravel and sand are not minerals under the mining laws), with Layman v. Ellis, 52 Pub. Lands
Dec. 714, 718 (D.O.I. 1929) (holding gravel and sand are minerals under the mining laws).
97. Michael Braunstein, All that Glitters: Discovering the Meaning of Mineral in the Mining
Law of 1872, 21 LAND & WATER L. REv. 297, 301-04 (1986) (discussing the significance of the
determination of a substance as a mineral as critically important to the application of early 20th
century land grant and mining statutes).
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land grant statutes cover the substance.98  Oddly, the question of
whether a substance is a "mineral" is not a question of fact decided by
science; instead, it is a conclusion of law decided by bureaucrats and
judges. 99 As a result, the outcome of the question has been difficult to
predict. l00 For example, the Supreme Court has held that subsurface
groundwater is not a mineral subject to mining laws.10 1 However, two
circuits have not only concluded that subsurface geothermal steam is a
mineral subject to the SRHA mineral reservation provision but also that
the steam is a "valuable mineral" subject to additional regulations. 10 2
Immediately after the passage of the General Mining Act of 1872,103
the lack of a definition of "mineral" became problematic.' 0 4  While the
Mining Act did make specific reference to quartz, gold, cinnabar, silver,
lead, tin, copper, and "other valuable minerals," 105 executive officials
seized on the lack of clarity in the statute and issued rulings greatly
98. Id. Specifically, there are three main areas of mineral law governance that will be
triggered: the Mining Act of 1872, the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 and state
mining laws. Id. at 298.
99. See id. (noting "the question of whether a substance is a mineral is almost entirely a
question of policy and only incidentally a question of chemistry"); see also Cameron v. United
States, 252 U.S. 450, 464 (1920) (holding that findings by the Secretary of the Interior regarding
tracts of mineral land are conclusive absent fraud or imposition); Kirk v. Olson, 245 U.S. 225,
226 (1917) (holding the determination of whether land was valuable and therefore falls under
mining law was a question to be determined by officers of the Land Department); Murray v.
White, 113 P. 754, 758 (Mont. 1911) (finding that when land is valuable for both mineral and
agricultural purposes, controversies over which purpose the land is more valuable for are settled
by the Land Department); Robert L. Beery, 83 Interior Dec. 249, 252 (1976) (stating whether a
substance is a mineral depends largely on context). According to Professor Braunstein, this
means that the determination of whether a material is properly classified depends on the purpose
of the intended classification. Braunstein, supra note 97, at 301. Thus, those making this
classification must first decide that the transfer of the substance from public to private ownership
is appropriate in light of contemporary concerns and policies. Id.
100. See Braunstein, supra note 97, at 301 (explaining the difficulty in defining "mineral" and
potential conflicts that arise).
101. Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods., 436 U.S. 604, 617 (1978).
102. Rosette Inc. v. United States, 277 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 878 (2002) (holding that geothermal resources in land qualify as "minerals" under SRHA);
United States v. Union Oil of Cal., 549 F.3d 1271, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that all
elements of a geothermal system-magma, porous rock, strata, even water-may be classified as
minerals).
103. 30 U.S.C. § 23 (2000 & West Supp. 2005).
104. Braunstein, supra note 97, at 303 (tracing the origin of the mineral problem as stemming
from the failure to provide any meaningful guidance on the definition of "mineral."). The General
Mining Act was the first attempt at federally regulating the mining industry. See generally
STEVEN G. BARRINGER ET AL., THE MINING LAW OF 1872: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL
ANALYSIs (1989) (discussing the function of the General Mining Act and placing it in historical
context). Prior to its passage, most of the regulation occurred on the state level. Id.
105. 30 U.S.C. § 23 (2000).
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expanding the definition of minerals. 106  In 1929, the Interior
Department adopted noted legal scholar Curtis Lindley's three-pronged
test to determine whether a substance was a mineral. 10 7 Under the
Lindley test, a substance is a mineral for the purposes of the mining
laws if: (1) it is recognized as a mineral by the standard authorities on
the subject, (2) it is classified as a mineral product in trade or
commerce, or (3) it is a substance that possesses an economic value. 10 8
Ultimately, the Supreme Court, in Andrus v. Charlestone Stone
Products, rejected this test because many substances could pass the
Lindley test but were not thought to be "the type of mineral that the
1872 Congress intended to make the basis of a valid claim."
' 10 9
While the definition of "mineral" has been frequently litigated and
the Interior Department does not appear to be any closer to
promulgating a test since the Lindley test was discarded by the Supreme
Court almost thirty years ago, Congress provided some guidance for
commonly mined materials with the Common Varieties Act.110 This
Act specifically states that sand and gravel are not valuable minerals
within the context of the mining laws unless they fit into the "distinct
and special value" exception of the statute."' Unfortunately, the statute
106. See, e.g., 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 115, 116 (1872) (including diamonds in the Mining Act);
Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310, 312 (D.O.I. 1910) (including gravel); Richter
v. Utah, 27 Pub. Lands Dec. 95, 98 (D.O.I. 1898) (including guano); Commissioner's Ruling,
reprinted in HENRY N. COPP, UNITED STATES MINERAL LANDS 100 (2d ed. 1882) (including
borax); Commissioner's Ruling, reprinted in COPP 121 (including fire clay).
107. Layman v. Ellis, 52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714, 719-20 (D.O.I. 1929). Curtis Lindley wrote A
Treatise on the American Law Relating to Mines & Mineral Lands which is often cited in articles
concerning mines and minerals.
108. CuRTIS LINDLEY, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO MINES AND
MINERAL LANDS § 98 (3d ed. 1914), cited by Braunstein, supra note 97, at 304.
109. 436 U.S. 604, 612 n.8 (1978). Charlestone Stone Products held that water was not a
locatable mineral under the General Mining Act. Id. at 610. The Court focused on the national
interest in keeping lands with a water source separate from lands with a mineral source. Id. at
614 ("The conclusion that Congress did not intend water to be locatable under the federal mining
law is reinforced by consideration of the practical consequences that could be expected to flow
from a holding to the contrary."). Additionally, substances that meet the coverage in the
Common Varieties Act also would meet the Lindley test but are specifically excluded from the
coverage of the Mining Act. Id. at 617.
110. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (2000 & West Supp. 2005). The Common Varieties Act also includes
vegetative materials. See Marla E. Mansfield, A Primer on Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REV.
801, 831 (1983) (describing how the public land laws treat consumable materials).
111. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (2000). The Act states:
No deposit of common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, or cinders
and no deposit of petrified wood shall be deemed a valuable mineral deposit within the
meaning of the mining laws of the United States so as to give effective validity to any
mining claim hereafter located under such mining laws: Provided, however, That...
"Common varieties"... does not include deposits of such materials which are valuable
because the deposit has some property giving it distinct and special value.
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never defined what this phrase meant and left the Interior Department to
promulgate its own definition for the phrase. 112  The Department took
an economic approach, relating both the presence or absence of a
distinct special economic value and the deposit's potential use to the
typical use of the deposits in order to determine if the Common
Varieties Act applied.1 13  The Supreme Court has affirmed this
interpretation and further stated that the legislative history of the bill
indicated that Congress meant to exclude sand and gravel from the
coverage of the mining laws.1 14 The Common Varieties Act was meant
solely to curb abuses of the General Mining Act 115 and was not
applicable to the homestead land grant acts. 116 However, the Common
Varieties Act is significant to homestead land grant acts given the lack
of judicial precedents involving these acts. 117  Because of the lack of
clear guidance, courts interpreting the homestead land grant acts'
mineral reservation provisions have resorted to mining law
jurisprudence to determine whether a substance is a mineral. 18
Equally confusing, the mining laws give separate designations to
mineral deposits and "valuable deposits" but do not define what makes
Id. (emphasis added).
112. Braunstein, supra note 97, at 310.
113. United States v. Henderson, 68 Interior Dec. 26, 28-30 (1961) (holding appellant did not
show that he had a discovery of sand and gravel which possessed a special and distinct value).
114. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 605 (1968); see also H.R. REP. No. 84-730, at 6
(1939) (stating the ingenuity of American citizens has developed new and better ways to abuse
public land resources by obtaining title of the land through the mining laws).
115. Congressman Engle, a sponsor to the Common Varieties Act, stated:
The reason we have done that is because sand, gravel, pumice and pumicite are really
building materials and are not the type of material contemplated to be handled under
the mining laws, and that is precisely where we have had so much abuse of the mining
laws, because people can go out and file mining claims on sand, stone, pumice, and
pumicite taking in recreational sites and even taking in valuable stands of commercial
timber in the national forests and on the public domain.
101 CONG. REc. H7454 (daily ed. June 20, 1955) (statement of Rep. Engle).
116. See infra note 122. If an individual received land classified for homesteading purposes,
the mineral claims are voided as the General Mining Act is said not to apply. Diamond Coal &
Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U.S. 236, 239-40 (1914) (stating patentees, absent fraud, have the
right to retain all interests in land characterized by the Interior Department as non-mineral even if
the department made an error).
117. Watt v. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 42 (1983) (noting the lack of precedents on mining act
interpretation). While federal courts have often determined if a substance is a mineral under the
provisions of the Mining Acts, this case was the first time one addressed the question as pertained
to the homestead. Id. at 42 n.4.
118. Id. at 42-46; State ex. rel State Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, 487 P.2d 122 (N.M. 1971)
(holding that road building material from landowner's property had not been reserved to the
government in the patents and the government was therefore required to pay the landowner for
the material taken).
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a mineral deposit "valuable."' 19 The department has adopted a two-
tiered approach to the "valuable" classification.12 0  First, the land as a
whole must be evaluated to determine whether it is better suited for
agricultural or mining purposes. 12 1  Homesteading laws apply if the
land is determined to be better equipped for agricultural purposes, but
mining laws apply if it is determined to be better equipped for
mining. 122  Courts have determined that the decision to issue a patent
under the homestead provision implies a determination that the land is
not known to contain valuable minerals. 123  Furthermore, this
determination is exclusively the province of the Bureau of Land
Management; individuals may not challenge it in court. 124
Once land has been determined to be mineral in character, a second
analysis is then undertaken. 125 Under this analysis, the actual minerals
must be evaluated to determine whether they are valuable. 126  If a
mineral is deemed to be valuable, then the General Mining Act
applies. 127  If the mineral is not valuable, it is said to be common and
falls under the Common Varieties Act. 128  The Supreme Court has
never clarified what the term "valuable mineral" means under the Act;
however, commentators 129  and administrative courts 130  have each
119. 30 U.S.C. § 23 (2000).
120. See generally Anne M. Payne, Determination of Mineral Character; Land as "Valuable
for Minerals"; "Valuable Mineral Deposits," 53A AM. JUR. 2D Mines and Minerals § 25 (2005).
121. See generally Barden v. N. Pac. R.R. Co., 154 U.S. 288 (1894); Murray v. White, 113 P.
754, 758-59 (Mont. 1911) (finding title to known mineral land cannot be secured under an
agricultural entry).
122. Payne, supra note 120, § 25. The Homestead Act specifically exempted mineral lands
from its reach. 43 U.S.C. § 201 (repealed 1976). See also United States v. Lillibridge, 4 F. Supp.
204, 206 (S.D. Cal. 1932) (adopting a comparative value approach to the classification of national
forests); Ah Yew v. Choate, 24 Cal. 562, 567 (1862) (adopting the comparative value approach to
state land classifications).
123. West v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 200 (1929) (finding that since the Secretary of the
Interior did not determine the land in question was not known to be mineral land as a matter of
fact, but rather did so as a proposition of law, the company's title became unassailable and the
order of dismissal by the Secretary did not remove the land from the jurisdiction of the
Department of the Interior).
124. S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 51 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1931) (noting judicial courts have
no role in making the determination of whether land is primarily mineral or agricultural in
character); Helit v. Gold Fields Mining Corp., 113 I.B.L.A. 299 (1990) (applying the same
principle to administrative courts).
125. See Payne, supra note 120, § 25 (drawing a distinction between land "valuable for
minerals" and "valuable mineral deposits").
126. Id.
127. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
128. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (2000).
129. Carl J. Mayer, The 1872 Mining Law: Historical Origins of the Discovery Rule, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 624, 636-37 (1986) (advocating for the use of a marketability rule for defining
2005] Sand Wars
attempted to provide an adequate definition. The Supreme Court has,
however, adopted a marketability test for determining whether a
"mineral deposit" is valuable. 13 1  Under this marketability test, a
mineral deposit is valuable if it currently can be "extracted, removed,
and marketed at a profit." 132  Thus, it would appear that the
determination of "value" under the mining laws is based on
economics. 
133
D. Policy Objectives Behind the Specific Reservation of Mineral
Interests
The right of the sovereign to sever land into surface and mineral
components dates back to the Middle Ages. 134 This right transferred to
colonial America, and the Continental Congress responded by enacting
legislation reserving the rights to precious metals to the federal
government. 135  As the United States grew from east to west, the
government began to provide land grants as incentives for settlers to
when a mineral becomes valuable). In his article, Mayer rejects two alternative approaches. Id.
He first rejects the argument that the phrase "valuable mineral deposit" means any deposit that
could be sold on a market because that interpretation would render the word "valuable"
meaningless as all minerals would have some marketable value. Id. at 636. He then rejects the
argument that the phrase "valuable mineral deposit" is equivalent to any deposit of "valuable
minerals" because deposits of minerals and valuable minerals are dealt with separately by the
Mining Act. Id. comparing 30 U.S.C. § 21 (using the phrase "lands valuable for minerals") with
30 U.S.C. § 22 (using the phrase "valuable mineral deposits"), 30 U.S.C. § 23 (using the phrase
"other valuable deposits"), and 30 U.S.C. § 27 (using the phrase "valuable minerals and other
deposits"). Finally, Mayer concludes by interpreting the statute to include only deposits of
significant commercial value. Id. at 637.
130. See, e.g., United States v. J. Gary Feezor, 90 Interior Dec. 262, 269 (1983) (stating the
test used is whether a prudent man would be "justified in spending his time and means" with a
reasonable prospect of developing a paying mine).
131. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 601-03 (1968).
132. Id. at 602; accord United States v. Pierce, 75 Interior Dec. 270, 278-79 (1968) (adopting
the marketability test for all minerals). See also United States v. Iron Mining Co., 128 U.S. 673,
683-84 (1888) (adopting the marketability rule only for non-metals).
133. Coleman, 390 U.S. at 602-03. The law has developed to the point where the question of
whether a "mineral deposit" is valuable or whether a mineral is a "valuable mineral" are different
questions sometimes with different answers. Id.
134. See The Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1295 (K.B.
1606) (finding a landowner did not hold the rights to substances used to make gunpowder
because the Crown's interests in the defense of the British Isles exceeded the private rights of
individuals); The Case of Mines, 75 Eng. Rep. 472, 477 (Ex. 1567) (finding the Queen of
England has by prerogative of the crown the rights to any ore of gold or silver found on any estate
in her realm); see also BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *18-19 (noting the rights of the
sovereign to harvest minerals has been a right from time immemorial); Hill & Ripley, supra note
74, at 589 (tracing the origin of the severed mineral estate).
135. Hill & Ripley, supra note 74, at 590 (citing 28 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG. 1774-
1789, at 378 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed. 1933)) (noting that the Act of May 20, 1785 reserved one-
third of all gold, silver, lead and copper mines to the federal government).
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cultivate the western part of the nation. 136  When the Industrial
Revolution spread to the United States, the government realized the
national economy would best be served by encouraging the concurrent
development of surface and subsurface estates. 137 In an altruistic view,
this severance reflects the aim of public policy to assure a usable
mineral supply and the energy derived from the minerals, while keeping
land surfaces available for individuals. 
138
While courts and Congress have each stated that the purpose of the
land grant acts is to allow the concurrent development of both estates, in
reality the severance provisions allow mineral rights to become
dominant over the surface rights.13 9 As courts have dealt with the
inevitable disputes between those wishing to exert their mineral rights
and those wishing to exert their surface rights, the courts have
developed an "accommodation doctrine," whereby surface owners must
accommodate the mineral owners even if doing so causes harm to the
surface. 14  In an extreme example of the application of this doctrine,
the Supreme Court once permitted a mineral company to proceed to
mine in the middle of an established Colorado town, an act that
destroyed much of the town's infrastructure, on the grounds that the
company was advancing the national interest in the harvesting of
minerals. 14 1  Eventually, courts tempered their accommodations and
now allow miners to only possess the portion of land "reasonably
necessary" for the exploration and development of the minerals. 142 The
136. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Congressional land grant statutes); see also Hill &
Ripley, supra note 74, at 590.
137. See Watt v. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 50 (1983) (stating the purpose of the SRHA); H.R.
REP. No. 64-35, at 4, 18 (1916) (stating the primary function of the SRHA is to encourage the
development of both mineral and surface estates); Hill & Ripley, supra note 74, at 597-600
(discussing the SRHA provisions and its regulatory amendments).
138. Hill & Ripley, supra note 74, at 597-98 (discussing the objectives of the federal
government in passing severance legislation).
139. Michelle A. Wenzel, The Model Surface Use and Mineral Development Accommodation
Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 607, 622-24 (1993).
140. Hill & Ripley, supra note 74, at 592-96 (tracing the origins of the accommodation
doctrine as one that developed court by court and case by case).
141. Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 106 U.S. 447, 449-50 (1882). The Steel decision
also stated the miners' rights are independent from the settlement of a town, and as a result, the
miner is treated the same way as if he acquired the property by "discovery ... in a wilderness."
Id. at 449. State court decisions of the time were also unkind to surface dwellers. See Pa. Coal
Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 459 (Pa. 1886), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker
Co., 319 A.2d 871 (Pa. 1974) (labeling the concerns of surface owners "trifling
inconveniences ... [that] must sometimes give way to the necessities of a great community").
142. Sanford v. Arjay Oil Co., 686 P.2d 566, 572 (Wyo. 1984) (stating that the amount of land
"reasonably necessary" includes space required for all mining purposes, including storage and
removal, and that it is a question of fact); see also Hill & Ripley, supra note 74, at 592-93
(discussing the temperament of the doctrine); Marvin D. Truhe, Surface Owner vs. Mineral
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Pittman Act also placed limitations on subsurface developers, requiring
them to compensate the surface owner for any damages done to crops or
improvements on the land. 143  However, these decisions came after
years of mineral owners asserting almost complete control of an
estate. 
14 4
As the temperament of the accommodation doctrine continued, the
split estate system allowed for a rapid urbanization of the American
West. 145 Cities such as Denver, Las Vegas, Phoenix and Salt Lake City
have sprung to life from stops along railroad lines into truly modern
cities with diverse business communities. 146 The development of these
cities also means that Western rural areas have become "sparse and
declining."'147 Thus, the government must be willing to utilize its public
lands to provide incentives for the re-development of these rural
148areas. Employing severed estates, the government can accomplish
what it did a century ago by allowing rural Western lands to perform to
their highest and best use through concurrent development. 149  The
Owner or "They Can't Do That, Can They?", 27 S.D. L. REv. 376, 385-88 (1982) (surveying the
reasonable and necessary standard of accommodation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 2.15 (2000) (codifying the accommodation doctrine as a default rule that can only
be subverted with clear language to the contrary in a land conveyance).
143. Pittman Act, Pub. L. No. 66-60, § 8, 41 Stat. 293-95 (1919), repealed in part by Pub. L.
No. 88-417, 78 Stat. 389 (1964).
144. See Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 599 (Pa. 1893) (stating the assertion
of the rights of a surface owner could mean "the public might be debarred the use of the hidden
treasures which the great laboratory of nature has provided for man's use in the bowels of the
earth").
145. See Rasband, supra note 33, at 1 (advocating a need to change the current government
policy of reserving large sections of the West for public use). In fact, research now shows the
West is the most urban area in the country. Id. at 5, 7 n.18. See also A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B.
Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western Water Law: From Urban Oases to
Archipelagoes, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 163, 164 (1999) (noting 86% of
westerners live in urban areas).
146. See supra Part II.A (discussing the development of Las Vegas); see also Rasband, supra
note 33, at 20 (discussing the growth of urban "archipelagoes" following the Second World War).
147. Rasband, supra note 33, at 21 (quoting Pamela Case & Gregory Alward, Patterns of
Demographic, Economic and Value Change in the Western United States: Implications for Water
Use and Management 8 (Report to the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission)
(1997)).
148. See id. (noting in particular three rural Western towns-Moab, Utah; Coeur D'Alene,
Idaho; and Jackson Hole, Wyoming-which have been successful capitalizing on their proximity
to national parks and created a tourism economy). While it is impossible for all rural towns near
public lands to establish a tourism economy, rural towns can capitalize on public lands for other
purposes. Id. at 24-43 (debunking the current position of the government that public lands
should be used primarily for preservation and recreation).
149. See Stephen Sussna, The Concept of Highest and Best Use Under the Takings Theory, 21
URB. LAW. 113, 113 (1989) (noting the concept of "highest and best use" has long been
employed in property law, especially when the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is
exercised). The test for whether land is at its highest and best use varies from jurisdiction to
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continuance of the reservation policy can also serve to protect rural
western towns that have historically been mining communities.
150
E. The Role of Administrative Law and Interior Department Agencies
in Resolving Mineral Rights Disputes
The United States Constitution provides the federal courts with the
authority to resolve cases or controversies arising under federal law.
15 1
In addition, both the federal government 152 and state governments
153
have vested certain administrative agencies with quasi-judicial authority
over civil disputes. 154  These administrative agencies sometimes have
broad authority, 155 and their decisions are only overturned by judicial
jurisdiction, but all the tests require the use to be legally and physically possible, appropriately
supported, financially feasible and resulting in the highest land value. Id.
150. See Rasband, supra note 33, at 55; see also Dale A. Oesterle, Public Land: How Much is
Enough?, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 521, 526-29 (1996) (discussing the impact of federal land subsidies
on today's rural western towns and arguing that reservation policy wastes resources, is
economically unsound, and encourages environmental damage).
151. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority.").
152. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000) (outlining the procedures
and function of administrative courts) [hereinafter referred to as "APA"]. See also Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) (affirming Congress's Article I power to
vest an administrative court with the authority to adjudicate disputes). The provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act are meant to create a uniform and comprehensive regulatory
scheme governing such aspects of agency action such as investigations, adjudications,
rulemaking, licensing, and open meeting and disclosure requirements. Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 2 AM. JUR. 2D Admin. Law § 14 (2005). It covers basically every action
undertaken by an executive branch agency, other than the Defense Department. 5 U.S.C. §
701(b)(1) (2000).
153. See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 23-24 (Ill. 1997) (permitting the state
Human Rights Commission to adjudicate common law tort claims that are "inextricably linked"
to claims of sexual harassment, which the agency is statutorily commissioned to investigate and
adjudicate); McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 777 P.2d 91, 108 (Cal. 1989) (upholding
the authority of a California administrative court to set aside excess rents).
154. See generally JEFFREY A. PARNESS, CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS 251-74 (2001) (discussing the role of administrative courts in the judicial system).
155. See Powers of Presiding Officers and Administrative Law Judges, 2 AM. JUR. 2D Admin.
Law § 312 (2005) (indicating an administrative law judge or presiding officer has the authority to
administer oaths and affirmations; issue subpoenas authorized by law; rule on offers of proof and
receive relevant evidence; take depositions or have depositions taken when the ends of justice
would be served; regulate the course of the hearing; hold conferences for the settlement or
simplification of the issues by consent of the parties or by the use of alternate means of dispute
resolution; inform the parties as to the availability of one or more alternative means of dispute
resolution and encourage use of such methods; require the attendance, at any conference for the
settlement or simplification of the issues, of at least one representative of each party who has
authority to negotiate concerning resolution of the issues in controversy; dispose of procedural
requests or similar matters; make or recommend decisions; or take other action authorized by
agency rule consistent with the APA); see also In re Samuel Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (1999)
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courts in rare circumstances.
156
The principle of judicial review has always applied to Interior
Department administrative review agencies. 157  Typically, these
adjudications take place in front of the Bureau of Land Management,
which is charged by the Secretary of the Interior and the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act to handle all disputes regarding the
disbursement of public lands. 158 The Interior Department permits these
determinations to be appealed internally to the Board of Land Appeals
(BLA). 159 These appellate decisions become the decision of record, and
as a result, the reviewing district court will only look to the record of
(illustrating that an administrative agency has the power to detain and/or remove an immigrant
from the United States); Maksimovic, 687 N.E.2d at 22 (illustrating that an administrative agency
has the authority to issue punitive damages); Jody Desomma v. All World Farms, 61 Agric. Dec.
821, 827 (2002) (illustrating an administrative agency has the authority to issue injunctive relief).
156. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The APA states a reviewing court may set aside an agency action
only if the action is found to be:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to [specific provisions of the
title]; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by
the reviewing court.
Id.
157. See, e.g., Bales v. Ruch, 522 F. Supp. 150, 152 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (noting that while the
Interior Department did have primary responsibility to determine the validity of mining claims,
the district courts maintained the right to review those determinations); Roberts v. Morton, 389 F.
Supp. 87, 89 (D. Colo. 1975), affd, 549 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating the district court did
have jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act to review Interior Department decisions
regarding mining claims). See also J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Judicial Review of Interior
Department Decisions Affecting Claims of Mineral Interests in Public Lands, 5 A.L.R. FED. 566,
§ 2 (1970) (discussing the relationship between the federal courts and the decisions of the Interior
Department's agencies).
158. David L. Hughes, Practice and Procedure Before the Interior Board of Land Appeals, 14
PUB. LAND L. REV. 113, 116-17 (1993). The BLA consists of nine administrative judges, all of
whom are attorneys with backgrounds in natural resources law. Id. at 118-19. One judge is
appointed as the chief administrative judge and supervises the other administrative judges and
manages the operations of the BLA. Id. at 119. The deputy chief administrative judge assists the
chief judge in managing BLA operations. Id. Although the chief judge participates in
determining how to consider a particular case, the chief judge has only one voice in how a
particular case is decided. Id. The BLA conducts a de novo review of the BLM's decision. Id.
(citing 43 C.F.R. § 4.1).
159. See, e.g., W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 343 F.3d 239, 241-43 (4th Cir.
2003) (illustrating the appellate power of the BLA); Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs v. Hess, 297
F.3d 310, 328 (3rd Cir. 2002) (discussing the procedure for appeals of Bureau of Land
Management decisions).
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this appellate proceeding. 160 In most cases, a losing party must take its
appeal to the BLA before going into federal district court as the district
court will not review the decision of an administrative agency until the
administrative remedies have been exhausted. 16 1  Judicial review of
BLA proceedings does not stay the effect of the BLA's decision.
162
Once a decision is rendered by the BLA, petitioners must make a
special request for injunctive relief or a restraining order. 163  Thus,
while the decisions of the Bureau of Land Management and the BLA
carry little precedential value, their decisions carry great weight to those
wishing to avoid expensive court battles. 
164
F. A Primer on Statutory Interpretation
Just as the principles of administrative law play an important role in
understanding the BedRoc Ltd. case and the reasons for a lack of
judicial case law on the important subject of mineral rights, the
160. United States v. Smith Christian Mining Enters., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D. Or. 1981).
The practice of making the appeal decision based on the record is fairly common. See, e.g.,
Greenlaw v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 701 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (noting an
adjudication from the Illinois Department of Employment Security's Board of Review is the only
decision considered by the reviewing court). Procedurally speaking, a party seeking judicial
review must bring the action against the Secretary of the Interior and not directly against the
United States or subordinate bureaus of the department. See Chournos v. United States, 335 F.2d
918, 918 (10th Cir. 1964) (affirming a dismissal of a suit against the United States, Bureau of
Land Management, Interior Department and a local subordinate of the Interior Department on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction).
161. See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338 (1963) (holding federal
courts, in some cases, must wait for an agency's adjudication procedures to be exhausted before
evaluating the sufficiency of the petitioner's claim); Burnham Chem. Co. v. Krug, 81 F. Supp.
911, 913 (D.D.C. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Burnham Chem. Co. v. Chapman, 181 F.2d 288 (D.C.
Cir. 1950) (holding the failure of an applicant to exhaust his administrative remedies served as a
bar to injunctive relief in federal court). A limited exception to this exhaustion requirement is
recognized in cases where the department has exceeded its authority or the administrative remedy
would be inadequate relief. See Ickes v. Va.-Colo. Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639, 647 (1935)
(holding an action by the Interior Department that was beyond its statutory authority is subject to
immediate judicial review); Oil Shale Corp. v. Udall, 235 F. Supp 606, 607-08 (D. Colo. 1964)
(holding in cases where agency relief would be an inadequate remedy, the petitioner could seek
immediate judicial review).
162. See Udall, 235 F. Supp. at 608 (noting that injunctive relief is required to keep the
Interior Department from enforcing its administrative determination).
163. Winkler v. Andrus, 494 F. Supp. 946, 947 (D. Wyo. 1980) (stating that a request for
judicial review by a federal district court must be commenced within ninety days of the BLA
decision).
164. See, e.g., Fabi Constr. Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 370 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(upholding the findings of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission on eight
separate points). For example, in BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, the mining company's legal battle
lasted twelve years and involved going before the Bureau of Land Management twice, the Board
of Land Appeals, a federal district court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and ultimately the
United States Supreme Court. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 1591-92 (2004).
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interpretation of statutes plays an especially important role in ultimately
deciding whether a substance is or is not reserved to the government.
Thus, in order to fully understand the BedRoc Ltd. decision, one must
first understand how courts interpret statutes. 166 As the Supreme Court
has consistently recognized, when Congress puts language in a statute,
it says what it means and means what it says. 167  The Court will
generally not entertain an argument that the statute was improperly
drafted when it is asked to interpret a statute. 168 Thus, when the Court
finds an unambiguous statutory text, judicial inquiry begins and ends
with the language used. 169  Courts may not presume that a legislature
did not know what it was doing when it used particular language. 170
This rule is similar to the parol evidence rule in contract law, which
states that when a contract is unambiguous and meant to be a written
elaboration of an agreement, no extrinsic evidence may be considered
and the language of the text is all that is consulted. 171
165. Richard Yuen, Casenote, BedRoc Ltd. v. United States: Deciding How Courts Interpret
Statutes When There are Ambiguous Terms, 8 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 89 (2003).
166. See id. at 93-95 (discussing the method in which the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
Pittman Act and the SRHA).
167. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)
(citing Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)). See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S.
Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (interpreting an attorney's fee provision in the bankruptcy
code); Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 530 U.S. at 6 (also interpreting the bankruptcy code);
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (interpreting ERISA). In fact, the
Court has called this principle the pre-eminent canon of statutory interpretation. Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
168. See, e.g., Inhabitants of the Twp. of Montclair, County of Essex v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S.
147, 152 (1883) (holding that it is the Court's duty to give effect to each word of a statute,
assuming the legislature is aware of the words it used).
169. See, e.g., Lamie, 124 S. Ct. at 1029 (setting forth its methodology for interpreting
statutory bankruptcy protections); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal, 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (requiring
courts to first determine whether a statute is ambiguous before attempting any other method of
analysis).
170. Montclair, 107 U.S. at 152.
171. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990) (noting most
states forbid oral testimony to the varying terms in a contract); Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63
F.3d 1169, 1177 (2d Cir. 1995) (referring to the parol evidence rule as a rule of substantive
contract law); Jeanes v. Henderson, 703 F.2d 855, 861 (5th Cir. 1983) (recognizing the existence
of the parol evidence rule under Texas law); Comm'r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 779 (3d Cir.
1967) (confirming the parol evidence rule as a rule of substantive law); Globe Motors, Inc. v.
Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir. 1965) (noting that the parol evidence rule
forbids oral modification of a contract under Pennsylvania law); ARTHUR CORBIN, 6-26 CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 573 (Interim Ed. 2002) (defining the parol evidence rule as a rule of contract as
opposed to a rule of evidence); WILLIAM J. BOWE ET AL., PAGE ON WILLS §§ 19.3-.5 (2003)
(exploring the effect of the writing requirement on oral testimony for wills); SAMUEL WILLISTON
& RICHARD LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 33:1 (4th ed. 1999) (discussing
the parol evidence rule as a rule of substantive contract law). Hence, the parol evidence rule has
become universally accepted as a rule of substantive contract law.
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In making a determination of ambiguity, courts must ask the
ambiguity question not as a general matter but rather whether the statute
specifically conveys an ambiguous meaning "with regard to the
particular dispute" before the court. 172  If the court finds ambiguity,
then it may look to extrinsic "statutory" evidence in order to determine
congressional intent when the statute was enacted. 173  This extrinsic
evidence can take the form of committee reports, floor statements and
even amendments considered but not passed. 7 4 Courts must also defer
to administrative agency interpretations when a statute is silent or
ambiguous unless that determination is arbitrary or capricious.
175
When a statute contains clear language, the court will interpret the
words used by Congress as meaning their ordinary, contemporary and
common meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute unless
Congress specifically defines the words to mean something else.
176
Furthermore, when Congress uses words or phrases with a specific
common law meaning, the courts will then presume Congress meant to
incorporate the common law meaning into the statute. 177 Judges adopt
different philosophies in using extrinsic evidence to interpret statutes
within this framework. 17 8 Judges who use little extrinsic evidence are
said to exercise "judicial restraint" 179 whereas judges who find extrinsic
evidence to be significant and persuasive are said to exercise "judicial
172. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-41 (1997) (stating that in making the
determination the court will consider "the language itself, the specific context... and the broader
context of the statute as a whole").
173. See, e.g., Lanie, 540 U.S. at 539 (declining to resort to an analysis of the legislative
history of the bankruptcy statutes on the grounds the language used by Congress was clear,
definite, and unambiguous).
174. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 124 S. Ct. 2466, 2774 (2004) (using Senate
Reports as evidence of congressional intent); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 517 n. 1 (1993)
(using floor statements as evidence of congressional intent); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right
to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 204 (1982) (using amendments considered but not passed as
evidence of what Congress did not intend).
175. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-46 (1984)
(requiring the courts to use EPA determinations on the definition of the phrase "stationary
source" found within the federal Clear Air Act before turning to the legislative history of the law).
176. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (describing the ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning as a "fundamental canon of statutory construction").
177. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (adopting the "common-
law test" when a statutory definition is circular and explains nothing, and interpreting the term as
defined in a specific area of law "would thwart congressional design or lead to absurd results").
178. See supra notes 171-77 (citing to cases with various uses of extrinsic evidence).
179. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (8th ed. 2004) (defining judicial restraint as a
"philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby judges avoid indulging their personal beliefs
about the public good and instead try merely to interpret the law as legislated and according to
precedent").
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activism." 180  Throughout the twentieth century both approaches have
been adopted by courts in interpreting the mining laws.1°1 However, a
distinct trend has started in the Court's 2003-2004 term to construe
statutes narrowly.182
G. Judicial Interpretation of Mineral Rights Reservation
This Section will take a chronological look at the important cases
leading up to the BedRoc Ltd. decision. 183  First, it will explore the
administrative law determinations at the time the Pittman Act and the
SRHA were being considered, in order to better appreciate the
circumstances that Congress considered when enacting these laws.
184
After looking at these decisions, this Section will review the judicial
interpretation of the mining laws in effect at the time the Pittman Act
was passed by discussing the Supreme Court decision, Northern Pacific
Railway v. Soderberg.185 Then, it will discuss the 1983 Supreme Court
case Watt v. Western Nuclear that serves as the seminal case on mineral
reservations under the early twentieth century land grant statutes.
186
Next, this Section will discuss the 1999 Supreme Court decision in
Amoco v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe as an illustration of how the
Supreme Court dealt with interpreting these land grant statutes.
187
Finally, this Section will conclude with a Tenth Circuit decision
applying the Western Nuclear rationale to determine the classification
of geothermal steam under the SRHA mineral reservation provision.188
180. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (8th ed. 2004) (defining judicial activism as a
"philosophy of a judicial decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views about
public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions").
181. Compare Watt v. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 55-56 (1983) (applying a textual analysis to
the SRHA) with Pa. Coal v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 459 (Pa. 1886) (using the impact of mining on
the "great community" to rule in favor of the mining industry).
182. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-62
(2004) (distinguishing "standard" from "methods of standard enforcement" in the context of the
Clean Air Act); Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 124 S. Ct. 1741, 1748-49 (2004)
(interpreting the phrase "finance charge" in the Truth in Lending Act); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 124
S. Ct. 1023, 1032 (2004) (construing the term "attorney" for purposes of the bankruptcy code).
183. See infra notes 184-256 and accompanying text (discussing the important case law
leading up to BedRoc).
184. See infra Part II.G.1 (discussing the Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310,
313 (D.O.I. 1910) and Layman v. Ellis, 52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714, 721 (D.O.I. 1929) decisions
made by the Interior Department).
185. See infra Part II.G.2 (discussing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903)).
186. See infra Part II.G.3 (discussing Watt v. W. Nuclear, 426 U.S. 36 (1983)).
187. See infra Part II.G.4 (discussing Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865
(1999)).
188. See infra Part II.G.5 (discussing Rosette v. United States, 277 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 878 (2002)).
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1. Early Administrative Law Determinations
In 1910, the Interior Department issued the landmark decision
Zimmerman v. Brunson and ruled that the mineral laws and the
homestead reservation provisions do not cover gravel and sand that is
suitable for mixing with cement for concrete construction.
189
Importantly, the Interior Department, in deciding Zimmerman, treated
the analysis of what constitutes a mineral for the purposes of the mining
laws and what constitutes a mineral for the purposes of homestead laws
as interchangeable. 190 Thus, whatever is considered a mineral under the
General Mining Act is also a mineral under the homestead acts. 19 1 The
Department decided that for the purposes of these statutes, the phrase
"mineral" only included substances that had intrinsic value, as defined
by standard American authorities. 192  According to Zimmerman,
substances like sand and gravel will be treated as a "valuable mineral"
worthy of coverage under the mining and homestead laws, only when
some extrinsic condition is present that gives the mineral its value, such
as proximity to a town. 193 Also of significance, the Secretary found that
references to "gravel" in the mineral laws were not all-encompassing
terms; therefore, the court reasoned that the statutes' reservation of
"gravel" were limited only to gravel bearing gold or other metallic
189. Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310, 313 (D.O.I. 1910).
190. At the time this determination was made, land was still dispersed by the General Land
Office. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (outlining the origins of the General Land
Office). The Bureau of Land Management and the Bureau of Land Appeals did not exist yet. See
supra notes 75-76 (outlining the origins of the Bureau of Land Management). Instead, the
appeals were heard at the direction of the Secretary of the Interior. See, e.g., Ostlund v. N. Pac.
R.R. Co., 11 Pub. Lands Dec. 502, 502 (D.O.I. 1890) (indicating the Secretary ordered an appeal
rehearing by the register and receiver to determine whether the settlement of Ostlund in 1871 was
made within the "limits of the Indian country"). See also Zimmerman, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. at 313
(concluding that land was not mineral in character solely because the land's gravel and sand was
used for building purposes).
191. Zimmerman, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. at 313.
192. Id. at 312. Here, the Interior Department cited a specific test laid out in Pac. Coast
Marble Co. v. N. Pac. R.R. Co., 25 Pub. Lands Dec. 233 (D.O.I. 1897). Id. at 312. Under the
Pacific Coast test:
Whatever is recognized as a mineral by the standard authorities, whether of metallic or
other substances, when found in the public lands, in quantity and quality sufficient to
render the land more valuable on account thereof than for agricultural purposes, must
be treated as coming within the purview of the mining laws.
Pac. Coast, 25 Pub. Lands Dec. at 233.
193. Zimmerman, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. at 313. To make this determination, the Secretary cited
a number of its previous decisions. See, e.g., McGlenn v. Wienbroeer, 15 Pub. Lands Dec. 370,
374 (D.O.I. 1892) (holding that stone valuable only for building purposes is not covered by the
mining laws); Dunluce Placer Mine, 6 Pub. Lands Dec. 761, 761 (D.O.I. 1887) (holding deposits
of brick clay of insufficient quality for other purposes are not a "mineral" covered by the mining
laws), cited with approval in King v. Bradford, 31 Pub. Lands Dec. 108, 109-10 (1901).
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substances. 194 Importantly, this interpretation remained the position of
the Interior Department when the SRHA and the Pittman Act were
enacted in the early twentieth century.
195
After SRHA and the Pittman Act were enacted and nineteen years
after the Zimmerman decision, the Interior Department decided Layman
v. Ellis and changed its position on common sand and gravel. 196 In this
case, the General Land Office determined that a parcel of land was
valuable for its gravel deposits, but the Zimmerman decision required
the Office to conclude the land was mineral in character and thus not
subject to entry under the General Mining Act. 197  The Office then
asked the Secretary to reconsider its position, which it subsequently did
in a written opinion. 198  In choosing to reverse Zimmerman, the
Secretary used the standard American authorities' approach previously
used in Zimmerman and cited a number of geological surveys
discussing the economic value of gravel deposits and their classification
of gravel as a valuable mineral. 199 However, unlike the Zimmerman
decision, the Secretary in Layman adopted the three part Lindley test to
determine whether a substance is a mineral.2° °
2. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Soderberg
In 1903, the Supreme Court dealt with resolving the question of
194. Zimmerman, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. at 313. Interestingly, the Secretary did not offer any
authority for this interpretation. Id.
195. See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 1594-95 (2004) ("It is beyond
dispute that when the Pittman Act became law in 1919, common sand and gravel could not
constitute a locatable 'valuable mineral deposit' under the General Mining Act. The Secretary of
the Interior had held as much in Zimmerman v. Brunson.").
196. Layman v. Ellis, 52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714, 721 (D.O.I. 1929).
197. Id. at 715.
198. Id. at 715-16. In this case, Joseph Ellis and Gertrude and Dallas Layman were neighbors
occupying two subdivisions of land homesteaded to Mr. Ellis. Id. Gertrude and Dallas Layman
entered into an invalid contract where they would pay Mr. Ellis 15 cents per ton or 20 cents per
cubic yard of all the gravel hauled away, the proceeds of which would be used to make
improvements upon the land. Id. at 716-17.
199. Id. at 718-19. The Secretary in Layman makes specific reference to the following facts:
(1) in 1909, 23 million tons of gravel were sold and used for a combined value of $5.7 million,
(2) by 1927, over 100 million tons were sold for $51.2 million, and (3) the United States
Geological Survey has uniformly classified sand and gravel as not only a mineral resource but
also a commercially useful one. Id.
200. Id. at 719-20. As previously discussed, the Secretary chose a test outlined by Charles
Lindley that would classify a substance as a mineral if it is (1) recognized as mineral, by its
chemical composition, by the standard authorities, (2) classified as a mineral product in trade or
commerce, and (3) possesses economic value for use in trade, manufacturing, or the arts. Id. at
719. See also supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing the Interior Department's
adoption of the Lindley test); CURTIS LINDLEY, supra note 108, § 98 (outlining a method for
determining the mineral character of land).
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whether land containing a harvestable quantity of gravel makes the land
mineral" in character.2 ° 1 Through an 1864 Act of Congress,20 2
Congress incorporated the Northern Pacific Railway Company and
vested it with the power to build a railroad from Lake Superior to Puget
203Sound with a branch line down the Columbia River to Portland. To
accomplish this, Congress allowed the railroad to choose from up to
twenty alternative sections of public non-mineral land per mile on
which the rail line would be constructed. 20 4 Litigation arose as to the
classification of one of these sections, which Soderberg argued was
unavailable for use on the project because it was mineral in character,
and hence excluded under the 1864 Act.
205
In evaluating this question, the Court first turned to two sections of
the Act: Section 3 containing the actual mineral reservation, and Section
2 allowing the railroad to use materials from the adjacent lands in the
construction of railway. 206 It noted that these sections were designed to
ease the construction and operation of the railroad and not to be
substantive declarations of mineral reservations. 207  The Court then
turned to its analysis of what is or is not a mineral for the purpose of
classifying the land as "mineral" or "agricultural" in character and
indicated that given the broad range of the use of the phrase "mineral"
in the law, the Court must look at legislative intent as to the definition
and not consider how the scientific community would classify a
substance. 20 8  The Court then turned to an evaluation of additional
materials including public land legislation,209 administrative agency
201. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903).
202. 13 Stat. 365 (1864). Section 3 of the Act states: "Provided further, That all mineral lands
be, and the same are hereby, excluded from the operations of this act.... And provided, further,
That the word 'mineral,' when it occurs in this act, shall not be held to include iron or coal." Id.
203. Soderberg, 188 U.S. at 526.
204. Id. at 527.
205. Id. Soderberg entered the land in 1898 and began to quarry, remove, and dispose of the
granite under a mineral location, contending that such land is excepted from the general land
grant to the railroad under the 1864 Act. Id. The railroad brought suit to enjoin the extraction.
Id.
206. Id. at 529. Section 2 of the Act states: "the right, power, and authority is hereby given to
said corporation to take from the public lands, adjacent to the line of said road, material of earth,
stone, timber, and so forth, for the construction thereof." 13 Stat. 365 (1864).
207. Soderberg, 188 U.S. at 529-30.
208. Id. at 530. The Soderberg court indicated that given the wide use of the phrase "mineral"
in the law, it has become "absurd" to use scientific principles for making the determination. Id.
209. 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (providing "mining claims upon veins or lodes of quartz or other rock
in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, copper or other valuable deposits herein located"
shall be subject to coverage under the Act); 16 Stat. 217 (1870) (outlining placer mine
regulation); 14 Stat. 251 (1866) (declaring that all public lands shall be free and open to
exploration and occupation subject to the operation of the law and subject to the customs of the
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determinations 2 1 and decisions of American state courts21 1 and British
courts212 issued contemporaneously with the 1864 statute in order to
determine what Congress intended by the Northern Pacific grant in the
2131864 Act. The Court indicated these sources strongly suggested a
broad definition of "minerals" and concluded that the intent of the 1864
Act was no different.2 14  Hence, it ruled in favor of Soderberg in
holding the gravel deposits in the land Soderberg entered did make the
land mineral in character and hence, not subject to the railroad grant.215
3. Watt v. Western Nuclear
In 1983, the Supreme Court, for the first time, interpreted the SRHA
mineral reservation provision and found that it included all types of
216gravel. In Western Nuclear, the Bureau of Land Management issued
a notice of trespass to Western Nuclear, a firm specializing in uranium217
mining that held land patented under the SRHA in 1926. In its
mining industry).
210. Soderberg, 188 U.S. at 534 (noting that Land Department rulings support the assertion
that all lands "chiefly valuable for other than agricultural purposes" are mineral in nature).
211. Freezer v. Sweeney, 21 P. 20, 21 (Mont. 1889) (concluding that the owner of a placer
claim was entitled to all the minerals contained within the registered claim); Armstrong v. Lake
Champlain Granite Co., 42 N.E. 185, 189 (N.Y. 1895) ("We are of the opinion, therefore, that the
words 'minerals and ores,' in the grant of 1871, standing alone, would include the granite on the
premises."); Gill v. Weston, 1 A. 921, 923 (Pa. 1885) (concluding that mining lands included
those bearing petroleum because petroleum was a "mineral substance obtained from the earth by
a process of mining"); Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229 (1866) ("Throughout this opinion I have
treated oil as a mineral."); Johnston v. Harrington, 31 P. 316, 318 (Wash. 1892) (stating "[t]hat
stone is a mineral will hardly be disputed").
212. Rosse v. Wainman, 14 M. & W. 859, 872 (1845) ("Beds of stone, which may be dug by
winning or quarrying, are therefore properly minerals."); Micklethwait v. Winter, 6 L.R. Exch.
644, 655 (1851) ("[W]hatever stone is got from quarries, and separated from other stone, is
minerals in the ordinary sense of the word."); Midland Ry. Co. v. Checkley, 4 L.R.Eq. 19 (1867)
(holding that stone is "clearly" a mineral).
213. Soderberg, 188 U.S. at 530-37.
214. Id. at 536. Specifically, the court stated:
It is sufficient to say that we see nothing in [the 1864 Act], or in the legislation of
Congress up to the time this road was definitely located, which can be construed as
putting a different definition upon these words from that generally accepted by the text
writers upon the subject.
Id.
215. Id. at 536-37.
216. Watt v. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 42 n.4 (1983); see also Edward A. Amestoy, Is Gravel
a Mineral? The Impact of Western Nuclear on Lands Patented Under the Stock Raising
Homestead Act, 5 PuB. LAND L. REv. 171 (1984) (outlining the method by which the Supreme
Court decided Western Nuclear).
217. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 39-40. In the six months prior to receiving the notice of trespass,
the firm had extracted 43,000 cubic yards of gravel, used primarily for paving and pouring streets
and sidewalks in its company town. Id. at 39.
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complaint, the BLM stated Western Nuclear's removal of gravel
trespassed against the government's mineral rights reserved in the
SRHA patent.2 18  The Interior Department's Board of Land Appeals
affirmed the determination of the BLM and awarded damages. 219
Western Nuclear then brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior
challenging the Board's determination pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act. 2 2  The district court concluded the government position
was supported by the law because both legislative history and court
decisions have required narrow construction fo the public land grant
statutes. 22 1 The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision relying heavily on
Zimmerman's determination that sand and gravel did not constitute
minerals when Congress enacted the SRHA.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, citing the importance of the
case to the administration of the more than 33 million acres of land
patented under the SRHA.223  In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice
Marshall, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's determination and
found that sand and gravel did constitute minerals for the purposes of
224the SRHA. The Court noted that traditional definitions of the term
"mineral" tend to be exclusive, defining what a mineral is not, as
opposed to defining what a mineral is.225 The Court also noted that the
purpose of the SRHA was to facilitate concurrent development by
bifurcating surface and mineral estates. 226  This finding provided a
rationale for ruling in favor of the government's contention that sand
and gravel did constitute the type of minerals whose interest was
reserved to the government. 227 The Court then conducted an extensive
survey of the Roosevelt land grant reforms.228  It cited a long list of
218. Id. at 40. Interestingly, Western Nuclear, prior to obtaining the land from its predecessor
in interest, obtained a permit from the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality expressly
allowing it to extract gravel from the land. Id. at 39.
219. W. Nuclear, Inc., 85 Interior Dec. 129, 139 (D.O.I. 1978).
220. W. Nuclear v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D. Wyo. 1979).
221. Id. at 663.
222. W. Nuclear v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 234, 240 (10th Cir. 1981); see also W. Nuclear, 462 U.S.
at 42 (providing the procedural history of the Western Nuclear decision). The court used
Zimmerman and not Layman because the Zimmerman holding was in effect at the time the SRHA
was passed. W. Nuclear, 664 F.2d at 240.
223. W Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 42; see 456 U.S. 988 (1982) (granting certiorari).
224. W Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 60.
225. Id. at 43. Here, the court noted United States v. Toole, 224 F. Supp. 440 (D. Mont.
1963). Id. The Toole decision held that deposits of peat and peat moss were not minerals for the
purposes of the general mining laws. Id. at 43-44.
226. Id. at 47.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 47-56. See also supra Part 11.B (discussing the development of mineral rights and
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attempts by Congress and the Interior Department to preserve the
government's interest in mineral rights as a vehicle to promote mineral
exploration in a more honest and fair-handed manner. 229  The Court
rejected a strict "commercially marketable" test and instead adopted a
four-pronged definition for what constitutes a "mineral" for the
purposes of the SRHA.230  The Court found the SRHA reserved
substances that (1) are inorganic, (2) can be removed from the soil, (3)
used for commercial purposes, and (4) were not intended to be included
in the surface estate. 2 31 Based on this test, the Court found that sand
and gravel did constitute minerals reserved under the SRHA.232
However, the Court never discussed the applicability of their holding to
other land grant statutes. 2
3 3
4. Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe
In 1999, the Supreme Court evaluated whether coal-bed methane gas
(CBM) is a substance reserved in a mineral reservation provision of two
other Roosevelt land grant reform acts, the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and
1910. 234  In Amoco, the government issued a series of surface land
patents to various settlers but gave its coal reservation to the Southern
Ute Indian Tribe.2 35 A dispute arose between the Indian tribe and the
reservations in the United States).
229. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 47-56. This section of the decision makes reference to a series
of congressional committee reports and congressional testimony by members of the Interior
Department. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 64-35, at 5, 10 (1916) (showing a need for mineral reservation
provisions in the SRHA); 41 CONG. REc. 2615 (1907) (referencing a statement by President
Theodore Roosevelt stating that the prevalence of land fraud and the need to dispose coal "under
conditions which would inure to the benefit of the public as a whole"); H.R. Doc. No. 60-5, at 15
(1907) (quoting a statement by the Interior Secretary advocating for the bifurcation of land
interests as the best possible way to insure the public against land fraud). However, the court did
note that the efforts of the Interior Department and Congress went on without either knowing
fully what the other side was doing. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 45-47.
230. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 53.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 60.
233. See Petition for Certiorari at i, BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1587 (2004) (No.
02-1593) (requesting clarification of the Western Nuclear rule). In its petition for certiorari,
BedRoc, as one of its questions presented, asked whether the Western Nuclear decision called for
a per se rule that all sand and gravel were reserved on land patented by the early twentieth
century. Id.
234. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999). See also Coal Lands Act
of 1909, 35 Stat. 844 (1909) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 81 (2000 & West Supp. 2005))
(authorizing the Interior Department to issue land patents to homesteaders for agricultural use of
lands that reserved the government's interest in coal); Coal Lands Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 583
(1910) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 83-85 (2000 & West Supp. 2005)) (expanding the
1909 Act to additional lands).
235. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 870.
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oil company, who, in reliance upon a 1981 determination of the Interior
Department that CBM gas was not reserved by the Coal Lands Acts,
bought up these surface patents and began extracting the CBM gas at
considerable profits.236 The dispute reached the Supreme Court, which
ruled CBM gas was not in the contemplation of Congress when it
reserved the government's interest in "coal" and, hence, was not the
property of the Indian tribe.
237
In making this determination, the Court noted that, at the time
Congress enacted the Coal Lands Act, CBM gas was considered such a
dangerous by-product of coal mining that Congress had already enacted
coal mining safety regulations 238 aimed at curbing CBM explosions.
239
While the Court noted some attempts to harvest CBM gas for
commercial use prior to the Coal Lands Acts, 240 it determined the
relatively small industry fell beyond the "contemplation of Congress"
when it enacted the Coal Lands Acts.2 4 1 According to the majority of
the Court, Congress only began to recognize the commercial viability of
CBM gas during the OPEC oil embargo of the 1970s. 242 In response to
the embargo, the government issued substantial grants and tax credits as
a way of encouraging its production.243  Significantly, the Court's
decision established that substances reserved by the early 1900s land
grant statutes are fixed and, thus, not subject to revisions based on
advances of science.244 In other words, what was or was not a mineral
236. Id. at 871 (citing Ownership of and Right to Extract Coalbed Gas in Federal Coal
Deposits, 88 Interior Dec. 538, 539 (D.O.I. 1979)). Interestingly, the Interior Department
withdrew the 1981 determination and endorsed the position of the tribe in a one-line order entered
the day the government's response to Amoco's petition for certiorari was due. Amoco, 526 U.S.
at 872.
237. Id. at 880.
238. See, e.g., Territorial Mine Inspection Act, § 6, 26 Stat. 1105 (1891) (providing for the
appointment of mine inspectors to conduct inspections and report on safety conditions).
239. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 875-76.
240. See, e.g., U.S. Steel v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983) (noting that as early as the
1900s, wells were drilled in Pennsylvania for the purposes of extracting CBM); Edward A. Craig
and Marlee S. Myers, Ownership of Methane Gas in Coalbeds, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
767, 768-79 (noting that as early as 1746, methane was being used as a heating source in Great
Britain).
241. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 877.
242. Id. at 870.
243. Id. at 870-71 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 29 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (providing tax savings
for those engaged in the production of CBM gas); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5901-15 (West 2000)
(authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue grants promoting the production of CBM gas);
Maurice Duel & Ann G. Kimm, Coal Beds: A Source of Natural Gas, OIL AND GAS J., June 16,
1975, at 48 (advocating for the commercial production of CBM gas as a response to the OPEC
embargo)).
244. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 875-79. The Amoco court never mentioned the economic and
scientific advances that were central in the Layman court's determination. Id. Instead, it focused
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in 1910 will or will not be a mineral in 2010; a substance cannot
become a mineral through scientific realization. 245  Hence, these
statutes only cover "minerals" specifically in the contemplation of
Congress in the early 1900s.2 46
5. Rosette v. United States
In 2002, the Tenth Circuit in Rosette v. United States construed the
SRHA's mineral reservation provision to include geothermal steam. 2 4 7
This was the first time an appellate court addressed the mineral
reservation provision of the SRHA since the Western Nuclear
decision.24 8 It used the Western Nuclear four-part test to determine if a
substance such as geothermal steam had been reserved to the
government under the SRHA.2 4 9 Under this test, a substance would be
classified as mineral if it is (1) mineral in character, i.e., inorganic, (2)
removable from the soil, (3) usable for commercial purposes, and (4) of
such a character that there was no reason to suppose that Congress
intended it to be included in the surface estate when it enacted the
SRHA. 25  The parties stipulated geothermal steam satisfied parts (2)
and (3) of the test but disputed parts (1) and (4). 251
Rather than following the traditional deference given to an
administrative agency applying the same four-part test, the Rosette court
evaluated these areas independently. 2 52 In evaluating the first element,the court found that the Western Nuclear decision superseded a prior
squarely on the meaning of the word "coal" in 1909 and 1910. Id.
245. Id. at 880.
246. Id.
247. Rosette v. United States, 277 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 878
(2002); see also McNutt, supra note 77, at 44 (analyzing the Rosette decision reaffirming the
precedent that geothermal resources are reserved minerals).
248. Rosette, 277 F.3d at 1227. The court did find one instance were the geothermal steam
question was reached by an appellate court prior to Western Nuclear. Id. In United States v.
Union Oil Co. of California, the court construed the SRHA to include geothermal steam. 549
F.2d 1271, 1280 (9th Cir. 1977). In rendering its decision the court found the SRHA's mineral
reservation provision was drafted with "novel breadth." Id. at 1278. See supra Part II.G.3
(discussing the Western Nuclear decision).
249. Rosette, 277 F.3d at 1228.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 1228-29 (evaluating the first and fourth element, but as to the second and third
element, the court stated: "The parties do not dispute that geothermal resources as a whole are
removable from the soil and usable for commercial purposes. Therefore, these two parts of the
Western Nuclear test are satisfied.").
252. Id. at 1230 ("While it is true that great deference is given to the interpretation of a statute
by the agency charged with its administration, this respect is particularly due where the
administrative practice is a contemporaneous construction of the statute, which is not the case
here.").
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Supreme Court determination that water is not a "valuable mineral
deposit" under the General Mining Act.253 In evaluating the fourth
element, the court noted it must determine not what the government
intended to reserve in the mineral estate, but rather what it intended to
include in the surface estate. 254  Under this evaluation, the court
concluded that it was highly unlikely that Congress intended that
homesteaders taking a patent to the surface area could develop
geothermal resources for agricultural purposes. 25 5  Thus, it concluded
that geothermal steam is in fact a "mineral" reserved to the
government.
256
III. DISCUSSION
This Part will focus specifically on the BedRoc Ltd. dispute. It will
begin by explaining in detail the facts behind the litigation. 25  Then it
will discuss the Interior Department dispute,258 before moving on to the
litigation in the Federal District Court259 and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.260  Finally, it will discuss, in detail, the Supreme Court's
decision,2 6 1 including the concurring262 and dissenting opinions.
263
A. Facts of the Case
In 1940, Newton and Mabel Butler obtained a Pittman Act land
patent for 560 acres of land in Lincoln County, Nevada, sixty-five miles
north of Las Vegas. 264  Prior to receiving the patent, the Director of the
United States Geological Survey conducted an inspection of the land
and certified the land as non-mineral in nature and recommended its
distribution pursuant to the Pittman Act.2 65  As Section 8 of the Act
253. Id. at 1228 (distinguishing Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products, 436 U.S. 604 (1978)
from Western Nuclear).
254. Rosette, 277 F.3d at 1229. In drawing this distinction, the court noted that the
"established rule is that land grants are construed favorably to the government and nothing passes
except that which is conveyed in clear language, resolving all doubts in favor of the government."
Id. (citing Watt v. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 59 (1983)).
255. Rosette, 277 F.3d at 1229.
256. Id. at 1230.
257. See infra Part I1.A (discussing the events leading up to the commencement of legal
action).
258. See infra Part III.B (discussing the activities in the Interior Department).
259. See infra Part IHL.C (discussing the District Court action).
260. See infra Part IlI.D (discussing the Ninth Circuit decision).
261. See infra Part III.E. 1 (discussing the plurality opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist).
262. See infra Part II.E.2 (discussing the concurrence authored by Justice Thomas).
263. See infra Part HI.E.3 (discussing the dissent authored by Justice Stevens).
264. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2004).
265. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1003 (D. Nev. 1999), aff d, 314 F.3d
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requires, the patent explicitly contained a mineral reservation of "coal
and other valuable minerals in the land. '266 On February 24, 1993, Earl
Williams acquired the patented land and soon thereafter began to extract
267the sand and gravel on the land. On two separate occasions in the
spring of 1993, the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management
issued two notices of trespass for this extraction.268  During the early
stage of the proceedings, Earl Williams sold his interest in the land to
BedRoc. 269 The Interior Department continued to assert its rights to the
mineral deposits against BedRoc.270 After some negotiations, however,
the Department agreed to permit BedRoc to continue to remove these
deposits if it would hold in escrow a sum of money for each cubic yard
of sand or gravel removed that would be dispersed to the appropriate
party pending resolution of the Interior Department's trespassing
claim.Z71
B. Round 1: The Interior Department Makes Its Findings
The Bureau of Land Management issued an unpublished decision on
April 23, 1993, finding that Earl Williams had removed and sold
federally owned minerals without the benefit of a mineral contract and
was liable for future damages. 272  In reaching its decision, the BLM
consulted the Supreme Court's SRHA mineral determination in Western
Nuclear and found that the Court's holding constituted a per se rule for
the SRHA and the Pittman Act as well.273 Williams appealed the
1080 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 1587 (2004).
266. Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. 295, 299 (1997). Section 8 of the patent states:
That all entries made and patents issued under the provisions of this Act shall be
subject to and contain a reservation to the United States of all the coal and other
valuable minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right to
prospect for, mine, and remove the same. The coal and other valuable mineral deposits
in such lands shall be subject to disposal by the United States in accordance with the
provisions of the coal and mineral land laws in force at the time of such disposal.
Id.
267. BedRoc Ltd., 50 F. Supp.2d at 1003.
268. Id. These notices were issued pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 9239.0-7 (2005). See supra note
18 (quoting the full text of the regulation).
269. BedRoc Ltd., 50 F. Supp.2d at 1004.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 1003-04 (outlining the procedural history of the case). Prior to the BLM's
adjudication, Mr. Williams sent a letter to the BLM stating "[tihis property is my own personal
property and I do not feel that these are valuable minerals. Once we remove the over burdens
[sic] and the fact that it is 70 miles from Las Vegas, it is not valuable to anyone." Earl Williams,
140 I.B.L.A. 295, 297 (1997).
273. BedRoc Ltd., 50 F. Supp.2d at 1004.
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decision to the Interior Board of Land Appeals. 274 In his appeal,
Williams advanced the argument that the Western Nuclear decision is
not applicable to the Pittman Act because the statutes contain two
separate reservation provisions,275 that the land had been certified by
the government as not containing valuable minerals, 276 and that the true
test of whether a mineral deposit is owned by the Federal Government
is whether the deposit was locatable under the 1872 General Mining
Act.27
7
The Board of Land Appeals rejected this argument and affirmed the
decision of the BLM. 27 8  Administrative Law Judge R.W. Mullen's
decision noted that reliance on a single piece of analogous legislation is
of less value than an analogy to several statutes or a general course of
legislation in a particular period.279 Judge Mullen explored the
legislative history of the Pittman Act and noted that the crafting of the
mineral reservation provision occurred only after a careful
compromise. 2 8  Thus, after reviewing the legislative history, the Board
concluded that there was no evidence to show Congress meant to
convey sand and gravel to the surface estate.281  The Board cited a
series of Supreme Court cases suggesting that any ambiguity in
reservation provisions must be resolved in favor of the government and
noted if the government wished to convey an interest, it must have done
so with clear language.
282
C. Round 2: BedRoc Goes to Court
Following the Board's ruling, BedRoc and Williams brought suit in
274. Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. at 296.
275. Id. at 300. See also supra Part II.G.3 (discussing Western Nuclear); Part II.B (discussing
the differences between the Pittman Act and the SRHA).
276. Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. at 300-01.
277. Id. at 301.
278. Id. at 315.
279. Id. at 303 (citing NORMAN J. SINGER, 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 53.05 (5th ed. 1992)).
280. Id. at 304-13. Judge Mullen discussed in detail the careful compromise crafted by
Senator Pittman of Nevada and Representative Hayden of Arizona. Id. at 304. The board cited
the Census of 1910, id. at 305, letters and reports submitted by the Interior Department to
Congress, id. at 306, and even sections of two floor debates, one between Senator Thomas of
Colorado and Senator Pittman and another between Representative Blanton and Representative
Evans of Nevada regarding the mineral reservation provision, id. at 307-13.
281. Id. at 313-14.
282. Id. at 314 (citing Watt v. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 59 (1983); Andrus v. Charlestone
Stone Prods., 436 U.S. 604, 617 (1978); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116
(1957); Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1919); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188
U.S. 526, 534 (1903) to support the conclusion that sand and gravel are substances reserved to the
United States).
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federal district court against the government pursuant to Section 706 of
the Administrative Procedure Act on the grounds that the Board's
determination was "arbitrary and capricious" and based on an erroneous
interpretation of the mineral reservation provision of the Pittman Act.
283
BedRoc and Williams also argued that the proper interpretation of the
statute would be to define "valuable minerals" the same way as in the
General Mining Act, where deposits are only "valuable" if they are
reasonably marketable or profitable at the time of the patent's
issuance. 284 However, this position was dismissed by the district court
without explanation. 285  The district court first noted that statutory
language must first be construed using the plain and ordinary meaning
of the disputed language and the statute as a whole.2 86 The court noted
the term "mineral" defies simple resolution through a plain meaning
analysis, requiring the court to turn to the statute's legislative history.
28f
The district court agreed with the Board of Land Appeals' position on
the use of analogies in statutory interpretation but found that there were
not enough "similar statutes" for such analogies to be appreciated and
that the proper way of determining congressional intent is to examine
directly the legislative history of the Pittman Act. 288 In its exposition of
this history, the court found especially significant a floor statement
made by Senator Pittman on the minerals reservation provision. 28 9  In
this statement, he noted, "it is the policy of Congress, as I see it, not to
permit the acquisition of any character of minerals through agricultural
entry. ' 290 Thus, the district court found the term "valuable minerals" to
283. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1003 (D. Nev. 1999), aff'd, 314 F.3d
1080 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 176 (2004).
284. Id. at 1005; see also United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968) (adopting a
marketability test for determining whether a "mineral deposit" is valuable); supra notes 129-30
and accompanying text (discussing the definition of "valuable" under the General Mining Act).
285. Compare BedRoc Ltd., 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 ("This is an argument that this Court
declines to accept.") with Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. at 300-01 (outlining the petitioner's
mining law argument but declining to evaluate it on the grounds the legislative history of the
Pittman Act provides the proper framework from which to conduct the court's analysis).
286. BedRoc Ltd., 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1004 (citing Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 161 F.3d 1199,
1201 (9th Cir. 1998)).
287. Id. at 1007 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530 (1903)) ("The word
'mineral' is used in so many senses, dependent upon the context, that the ordinary definitions of
the dictionary throw but little light upon its signification in a given case.").
288. Id. at 1005 ("When plentiful sister statutes are absent, as in the case subjudice, it is best
to examine the legislative history and purpose of the disputed statute to discern Congressional
intent.").
289. Id. at 1006.
290. Id. (citing 53 CONG. REC. S705, S707 (1916)). Senator Pittman also noted that "[t]here
was not the slightest chance on earth of passing such a bill through the House of Representatives
if there was the slightest suspicion that the bill could be utilized for the purpose of acquiring
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be a broad term meant to encompass all minerals with desirable uses29 1
and granted summary judgment in favor of the government. 292
D. Round 3: The Ninth Circuit Decision
BedRoc then appealed the district court's determination to the Ninth
Circuit, which affirmed the decision.293 In making its determination, the
Ninth Circuit also cited the Soderberg decision for the proposition that
the term "mineral" is one beyond easy definition. 294  However, unlike
the district court, the Ninth Circuit was able to create a generalized
meaning for the word to include anything that is neither animal nor
vegetable. 29 5 The Ninth Circuit then addressed an argument raised by
BedRoc in the district court but dismissed without explanation-that the
modifier "valuable" meant that the Pittman Act contained a limited
reservation similar to those substances covered under the General
Mining Act.296 The court noted that a typical individual would not find
sand and gravel "valuable" in the way that diamonds or gold might be
considered valuable; however, the court did note that sand and gravel
are valuable in the sense that they have commercial worth.2 97 Thus, the
court concluded the mineral reservation provision was ambiguous,
requiring it to turn to the purpose and legislative history of the
statute.298
The court began its investigation of the legislative history by noting
the main function of the Pittman Act was to encourage the exploration
and development of water sources for agricultural uses within the state
of Nevada.299 Based on this desire to strengthen the agricultural base of
mineral lands under the guise of obtaining agricultural lands." 53 CONG. REC. S707 (1916)
(emphasis added in BedRoc Ltd., 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1006).
291. BedRoc Ltd., 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 (citing Soderberg, 188 U.S. at 536-37 (discerning
the legislative intent to reserve geological deposits useful to the arts or manufacturing processes)).
292. Id. at 1008. Both parties had moved for summary judgment. Id.
293. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 314 F.3d 1080, 1082 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 176
(2004).
294. Id. at 1083-84. See also supra note 287 (discussing the definition of "mineral").
295. BedRoc Ltd., 314 F.3d at 1084. To create this generalized definition, the Ninth Circuit
cited to the Third New International Dictionary and also noted that the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary included sand as an example of a "mineral." Id.
296. Id. Cf supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text (discussing the district court's
treatment of the BedRoc petitioner's "valuable" argument).
297. BedRoc Ltd., 314 F.3d at 1084. To make its point, the court cited an 1897 dictionary
defining "valuable" as "having value or worth; being possessed of worth or useful properties; ...
useful." Id.
298. Id. at 1085.
299. Id. at 1085 (citing H.R. REp. No. 66-286, at 1 (1919)) (stating the purpose of the Act was
to "encourage the exploration for and development of artesian and subsurface waters in the State
of Nevada") and H.R. REP. No. 64-731, at 1 (1916) ("The primary object of the bill is to
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Nevada, the court concluded Congress, in enacting the Pittman Act,
intended to reserve all minerals for other uses.30 0  The court also cited
two cases, United States v. Union Oil of California30 1 and Watt v.
Western Nuclear,30 2 to show that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation that
mineral reservation provisions are to be construed broadly had also been
used in evaluating other land grant statutes of the same period.3 °3
However, the court specifically rejected the notion that these cases
and the statutory history provided any guidance on the question of
whether sand and gravel were "valuable minerals" under the Pittman
Act.30 4 To answer this question, the court turned to Interior Department
publications of the time. 30 5  These publications indicated that the
mining industry in 1914 sold $24 million of sand and gravel.30 6 The
court also distinguished "valuable minerals" used in the Pittman Act
and "valuable mineral deposits" used in the General Mining Act307 and,
as a result, affirmed the district court's determination that sand and
gravel are included in the "valuable mineral" reservation of the Pittman
Act. 30 8  BedRoc then petitioned the Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari in late 2003.
encourage the development of the agricultural portions of the public domain in the State of
Nevada, not susceptible of irrigation from any known source of surface water supply.
300. Id. at 1085.
301. Id. at 1085-86 (citing United States v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir.
1977) (holding geothermal steam was reserved to the United States under the SRHA)). See also
supra note 248 (discussing the Union Oil decision).
302. BedRoc Ltd., 314 F.3d at 1086 (citing Watt v. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36 (1983) (holding
sand and gravel were also reserved to the United States under the SRHA)). See also supra Part
II.G.3 (discussing W Nuclear).
303. BedRoc Ltd., 314 F.3d at 1085-86.
304. Id. at 1088. The court wrote:
The breadth of the reservation of mineral rights discussed in the legislative history
supports the government's position: Congress did not intend to convey any mineral
rights to patentees under the Act. However, neither the cases construing the SRHA,
nor the floor debates on the Pittman Act, shed any light on whether the term "valuable"
significantly limits the reservation.
Id.
305. Id. at 1088-89 (noting that government publications at the time indicate that sand and
gravel were thought to be valuable, and hence reserved under the Pittman Act).
306. Id. at 1089. The court noted that $24 million is worth approximately $423 million today.
See id. at 1089 n.5 (converting the figure into today's dollars using a formula by John J.
McCusker, http://www.eh.nethmit/ppowerusd (last visited August 6, 2005)).
307. Id. at 1089-90 (noting that Congress did not mean to limit itself under the Pittman Act
the same way it desired to limit a mineral speculator under the General Mining Act).
308. Id.
309. See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 539 U.S. 986, 986 (2003) (granting the petition for
certiorari).
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E. The Final Round: The Supreme Court Rules for BedRoc
The Supreme Court's 6-3 decision did not come without serious
disagreement amongst the Justices of the court.310  Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia and Kennedy. 3 l  Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion
joined by Justice Breyer. 3 12 Justice Stevens issued a dissenting opinion
joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg. 313  This Section will explore
each of these opinions in detail starting with the plurality, 314 continuing
with the concurrence 3 15 and finishing with the dissent.
3 1
1. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality began with a short history lesson as to the function of
land grant statutes as a vehicle for Western expansion and a geography
lesson as to the location and climatology of Nevada. 317 The opinion
followed with a discussion of the mechanics of the Pittman Act 31 8 and
the facts of the case 319 before turning to the merits of the case, which
began with a discussion of Western Nuclear.
320
The plurality first evaluated whether the Government's argument that
the determination in Western Nuclear, cited at every level as controlling
the determination of the BedRoc and Williams matter, 3 2  did indeed
control the determination. 3 22  Here, the plurality found that Western
310. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 178 (2004).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 187.
313. Id. at 189.
314. See infra Part III.E. 1 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion).
315. See infra Part III.E.2 (discussing Justice Thomas's concurrence).
316. See infra Part flI.E.3 (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent).
317. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 178-79. The plurality cited the same House Report as the Ninth
Circuit stating the purpose of the Pittman Act was to promote the development and population
growth of Nevada. See also supra note 299 (discussing H.R. REP. No. 66-286 (1919)).
318. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 179-80.
319. Id. at 180-81.
320. Id. at 181-82. In its questions presented, BedRoc asked whether the court's ruling in
Western Nuclear "calls for a per se rule that all sand and gravel were reserved on land patented by
the federal government in the early 20th century, whether congressional intent would be better
served by a rule that such common materials were not reserved to the government as 'valuable
minerals.' Brief for Petitioners at i, BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (2004) (No. 02-
1593).
321. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 314 F.3d 1080, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct.
1587 (2004) (referencing Western Nuclear); BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1001,
1003, 1008 (D. Nev. 1999), aff'd, 314 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 176 (2004)
(referring to Western Nuclear); Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. 295, 314 (1997) (citing Western
Nuclear).
322. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 182.
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Nuclear was not controlling as it dealt with a different statute
entirely.32 3 The opinion then stated that in spite of a vigorous dissent in
Western Nuclear, it would not overrule its precedent or extend its
holding to conclude that sand and gravel were per se "valuable
minerals." Instead, the Court limited its holding to the conclusion that
sand and gravel are in fact minerals. 324  As justification, the plurality
recognized that the vagueness of the SRHA's mineral reservation
provision required the Western Nuclear court to speculate as to
congressional intent. 32 5 By using the modifier "valuable" in the Pittman
Act, the plurality noted Congress textually narrowed the scope of the
term "mineral" and, hence, clarified the confusion the Western Nuclear
court found with its reservation provision. 326 As the plurality stated, the
rules regarding the interpretation of unambiguous statutory text require
it to simply evaluate whether the sand and gravel found in Nevada were
commonly regarded as "valuable minerals" in 1919 when the Pittman
Act was enacted.327
Significantly, the plurality described the Government's position as
not contesting the proposition that sand and gravel were not commonly
thought of as "valuable" when the Pittman Act was enacted.328 The
plurality went on to state that sand and gravel were commercially
worthless in 1919 Nevada due to its sparse population and desert
climate. 329  Thus, the plurality rejected the position advanced by the
323. Idat 183.
324. Id. Interestingly, while the Court describes the petitioner's position that the decision in
Western Nuclear is either distinguishable from BedRoc's or, in the alternative, should be
overruled altogether, that position was not argued in the petitioner's brief. Cf Brief for
Petitioners, supra note 320, at 32-35 (arguing the Western Nuclear decision is consistent with the
understanding that deposits of sand and gravel without commercial value at the time of the patent
are not reserved to the United States as "valuable minerals").
325. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 183.
326. Id. at 183-84.
327. Id. at 184 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 873 (1999)
(stating that Congress intended terms to be understood in "their ordinary and popular sense");
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (stating that land grant laws should be interpreted
with the circumstances of the country at the time the act was passed in mind); Leo Sheep v.
United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682 (1979) (stating that the proper interpretation focuses on the
regular meaning of the reservation at the time Congress enacted it)).
328. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 184 (noting the government answered this question with an
emphatic "no"). The government did, however, title a two page section of its argument "Even If
There Is A Difference Between 'Minerals' And 'Valuable Minerals,' Sand And Gravel Were
'Valuable Minerals' When The Pittman Act Was Enacted." Brief for the Respondents at 30-32,
BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (2004) (No. 02-1593). See also infra Part IV.A
(discussing the efforts of the government to persuade the court that a substance could be a mineral
but not valuable).
329. BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 184 (citing Brief for Petitioners, supra note 320, at 6 (stating
"even the most enterprising settler could not have sold sand in the desert")).
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Government, that sand and gravel were commercially marketable at that
time in other parts of the United States as evidence that it was a
valuable mineral.330  Furthermore, the plurality also rejected the
argument on the grounds that it previously rejected a commercial
marketability meaning of "valuable minerals" in Amoco v. Southern Ute
Indian Tribe.3 3 1  Since the plurality found sand and gravel
unambiguously unvaluable, it did not need to resort to the statutory
canon used in many of the earlier cases that ambiguities in land grant
statutes are to be resolved in favor of the Government.
332
The plurality also accepted BedRoc's argument that the phrase
"valuable minerals" means the same in the Pittman Act as it does in the
General Mining Act,33 3 a position rejected by the district court with no
explanation 334 and by the Ninth Circuit with minimal explanation.
335
Here, the plurality used the statutory text's use of the phrase "mineral
land laws in force at the time of such disposal"336 as an explicit cross-
reference to the General Mining Act,3 37 which used the phrase
"valuable mineral deposits., 338  Using as guidance the Zimmerman339
determination, in effect at the time Congress enacted the Pittman Act,
which stated sand and gravel did not constitute valuable minerals under
the mining laws, the plurality found that sand and gravel are likewise
not a valuable mineral under the Pittman Act.34°  The plurality
recognized the finding in Western Nuclear that Congress may not have
330. BedRoc Ld., 541 U.S. at 184.
331. Id. at 184-85. See also supra Part II.G.4 (discussing the Amoco decision).
332. BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 185 (citing Amoco, 526 U.S. at 880 (stating "ambiguities in
land grants are construed in favor of the sovereign")).
333. Id.
334. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (D. Nev. 1999). See also supra
notes 284-85 and accompanying text (discussing the argument and its treatment at the district
court level).
335. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 314 F.3d 1080, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S.
176 (2004); see also supra notes 307-08 (discussing the argument and its treatment at the Ninth
Circuit).
336. Pittman Act, Pub. L. No. 66-60, § 8, 41 Stat. 295 (1919), repealed in part by Pub. L. No.
88-417, 78 Stat. 389 (1964).
337. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2000 & West. Supp. 2005).
338. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 185. In making its determination, the Court pointed out the
relationship between the mining laws and the land grant laws had also been recognized in
Western Nuclear. Id.
339. Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310 (D.O.I. 1910). See also supra Part
I.G.1 (discussing the Zimmerman determination). While the Zimmerman decision was
eventually overruled by the Layman decision, the Zimmerman decision was the position of the
Interior Department at the time the Pittman Act was enacted. See supra Part H.G. 1 (discussing
these two decisions).
340. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 185-86.
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been aware of the Zimmerman decision when it enacted the land grant
statutes but declined to entertain this proposition and instead limited this
341finding to the SRHA. Instead, the plurality noted the Pittman Act,
unlike the SRHA, unambiguously conveys its meaning that the
reservation provision of "valuable minerals" did not include sand and
gravel.342
Finally, the plurality opinion dismissed the argument that the
legislative history of the Pittman Act indicated that Congress meant to
reserve sand and gravel rights to the federal government. 343  Both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon this history and
each quoted large sections of this history in their opinion because of
their determination that the statute was ambiguous as to what constitutes
a "valuable mineral., 344 The plurality opinion, however, determined the
statute was not ambiguous, and as a result, they did not need to resort to
legislative history. 343 Furthermore, the plurality noted that a discussion
of the legislative history of the Act would serve as a backdoor attempt
to extend the Western Nuclear decision to the Pittman Act and refused
to evaluate the congressional reports, floor debates, and proposed
amendments cited by the lower courts.3 4 6 As a result of its findings, the
plurality reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
347
2. The Concurring Opinion
The plurality's method of analysis differed greatly from the previous
four bodies addressing this issue. As a result, it is not surprising that
341. ld.at 186 ("The Government is correct that the Western Nuclear court sidestepped the
impact of this line of reasoning by relying on the ambiguity of the term 'minerals' and the
possibility that Congress was not aware of Interior's Zimmerman decision.") (citing Watt v. W.
Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 45-47 (1983)).
342. Id. at 185.
343. Id. at 186-87.
344. See supra Part II.C (discussing the district court opinion) and Part II.D (discussing the
Ninth Circuit opinion).
345. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 186.
346. Id. at 186-87 (quoting Inhabitants of the Twp. of Montclair, County of Essex v.
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (noting the court will not resort to any inquiry that presumes
"the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed")).
347. Id. at 187.
348. Compare BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 178-87 (finding sand and gravel were not valuable
minerals under the Pittman Act) with BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 314 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir.
2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 176 (2004) (finding sand gravel deposits were valuable minerals under the
Pittman Act); BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (D. Nev. 1999), affd, 314 F.3d
1080 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 176 (2004) (finding sand and gravel deposits were valuable
minerals under the Pittman Act); and Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. 295 (1997) (finding sand and
gravel were valuable minerals under the Pittman Act).
2005]
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this method of analysis did not come with total agreement on thebench. 349 Justice Thomas issued a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Breyer suggesting that sand and gravel are not reserved to the
government under both the Pittman Act and the SRHA.35 ° Justice
Thomas noted the Pittman Act uses the phrases "valuable minerals" and
"minerals" interchangeably indicating congressional intent to make the
phrases synonymous. 351  Justice Thomas also noted that Western
Nuclear's rejection of the commercial marketability test as further
evidence that the Court should not place so much emphasis on the word
"valuable. ' 352  While the concurrence agreed with Western Nuclear's
determination regarding commercial marketability, it disagreed with
Western Nuclear's conclusion that sand and gravel are "minerals" under
the SRHA on the grounds the substances hypothetically could have
been used for commercial purposes. 353 However, Justice Thomas did
not advocate a reversal of Western Nuclear on the grounds of stare
decisis principles and the fact that property owners and the Interior
Department have heavily relied upon its ruling.
354
3. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion heavily criticized the plurality
opinion's reliance on the textual difference between the reservation of
"all the coal and other minerals" found in the SRHA and the reservation
of "all the coal and other valuable minerals" found in the Pittman
Act.355  He noted that the entire mineral reservation provision of the
Pittman Act made reference to the phrases "mineral" or "minerals" eight
times. 356 Since these phrases were only modified twice by the adjective
349. See supra notes 310-16 and accompanying text (noting the disagreements amongst the
Justices of the Court) and note 348 (noting the plurality's differing analysis from the other bodies
addressing the issue).
350. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 187-88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
351. Id. Justice Stevens made the same observation in the dissent. Id.
As Justice Stevens points out, the term 'minerals' in the Pittman Act provision is only
twice modified by the adjective 'valuable,' which 'suggest[s] that the terms 'valuable
minerals' and 'minerals' were intended to be synonymous.' I concur in the judgment,
however, because I believe that mineral reservations pursuant to both the Pittman Act
and the SRHA do not include sand and gravel.
Id. at 188 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
352. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 187-88 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("If the word 'valuable' were
the textual source of a commercial purpose requirement, then the SRHA's lack of that modifier
would strongly imply that the SRHA contains no commercial purpose requirement.").
353. Id. at 188.
354. Id. (indicating "stare decisis concerns are at their acme in cases involving property rights
and contract rights" (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997))).
355. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
356. Id. The plurality addressed Stevens's proposition in a footnote where it stated, "despite
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"valuable," Justice Stevens concluded the terms "minerals" and
"valuable minerals" are actually synonymous. 357  As a result, Justice
Stevens suggested the Western Nuclear decision did adopt a per se rule
that also would pertain to the Pittman Act.358  The dissent found no
public policy reason that Congress would enact a broad reservation
provision in the SRHA but a narrow provision in the Pittman Act,
359
and found that the plurality, in creating different tests, bucked the well-
recognized "need for certainty and predictability where land titles are
concerned. ' 36
Finally, Justice Stevens concluded his dissent by labeling the
plurality's unwillingness to consult the Pittman Act's legislative history
as deliberately uninformed.36 1 He noted this method will increase the
risk that a judge will substitute his own policy preferences for the
preferences of Congress. 362  For additional support, Justice Stevens
cited Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak's attack on
"minimalist" judging, noting that a proper judicial determination will
attempt to seek guidance from every reliable source.3 63 An evaluation
of congressional intent, Justice Stevens indicates, shows a Congress that
has acquiesced to the Court's decision in Western Nuclear that sand and
gravel are in fact "minerals" reserved to the government and the Interior
Department, which has consistently construed the mineral reservation
statutes as including sand and gravel. 36 4 As a result, the dissent argued
sand and gravel should be included in the mineral reservation provision
of the Pittman Act.
365
the textual difference, Justice Stevens nonetheless finds Western Nuclear dispositive because,
according to him, 'the Court's interpretation of the term 'mineral' in the SRHA included the
requirement that the material be valuable.' That is not quite correct." Id. at 183 n.5 (plurality
opinion) (citations omitted).
357. Id. at 191-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 190. According to Justice Stevens, the Western Nuclear test also would require
that a mineral be "valuable", i.e., able to be used for commercial purposes. Id. at 190-91
(outlining the Western Nuclear test).
359. Id. at 191-92.
360. Id. at 190 (citing Leo Sheep v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979) (holding that the
government had no implied easement to build a road across land that was originally granted to the
Union Pacific Railroad under the Union Pacific Act of 1862)).
361. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
362. Id. Justice Stevens explained that the "policy choice at issue in this case is surely one
that should be made either by Congress itself or by the executive agency administering the
Pittman Act." Id.
363. Id. (citing AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 62 (Y. Kaufmann trans., 1989)).
364. Id.
365. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
This Part will analyze the Supreme Court's decision and show that
the method employed by Justice Thomas provides the best resolution to
the case because it creates a "win-win" situation.366 To arrive at this
conclusion, this Part will first illustrate that the government should have
been more forceful in its assertion that the mineral reservation provision
of the Pittman Act is ambiguous in its language and that the inclusion of
the word "valuable" did little, if anything, to clear up the ambiguity.
367
Then, this Part will evaluate the plurality opinion authored by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and show that the opinion's quick dismissal of the
ambiguity of the reservation provision proved to the be fatal error in its
determination. 36 8  After the plurality opinion is scrutinized, this Part
will turn to the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens and show that,
while he was correct in finding the provision ambiguous, he ignored the
statutory canon that a law must be interpreted to give force to all of its
words.3 69  Finally, this Part will show that Justice Thomas's
concurrence, while short and direct, achieved the proper result with the
proper methodology.
3 70
A. The Government Should Have Been More Forceful in its Assertion
that the Mineral Reservation Provision Is Ambiguous
One of the most important sentences in the plurality opinion is the
one which states the Government did not contest the fact that sand and
gravel were not valuable.371  The Government did, however, on
numerous occasions present the opinion that sand and gravel were
indeed valuable minerals. 372  During oral argument, the Government
answered a question regarding the distinction between substances that
have intrinsic value, like uranium or gold, and substances that are
widespread and commonly found, like sand or gravel, by stating that all
of these substances are valuable minerals, but all have varying degrees
366. See id. at 187-89 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that sand and gravel are not reserved
to the government under the Pittman Act and the SRHA).
367. See infra Part IV.A (indicating the Government's argument was flawed from the
beginning).
368. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the plurality's error in declaring the reservation provision
unambiguous).
369. See infra Part IV.C (describing Justice Stevens's opinion as only partially correct).
370. See infra Part IV.D (explaining the correctness in Justice Thomas' concurring opinion).
371. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 184. "Common sense tells us, and the Government does not
contest, that the answer to [the question of whether Nevada sand and gravel were commonly
regarding as valuable in 1919] is an emphatic 'No."' Id.
372. See infra notes 373-79 and accompanying text (outlining the government's argument on
this point).
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of value. 373 The Government's brief to the Supreme Court contained an
entire section arguing that sand and gravel are indeed valuable
minerals. 374  The Government noted that between 1914 and 1919, the
Interior Department devoted an entire section of its annual report on
mineral resources to sand and gravel.375  In 1914, the Interior
Department placed the commercial value of the sand and gravel
industry at $24 million nationwide. 376 Two years later, the Department
reported that the sand and gravel market had boomed.377 By the time
the United States entered the First World War, sand and gravel had an
annual value higher than all but four non-metallic minerals produced in
the United States.
378
The Government did argue from a commercial standpoint that sand
and gravel were in fact valuable minerals at the time Congress enacted
the Pittman Act of 1919 and that, given the widespread use of sand and
gravel in the wartime economy, Congress had knowledge of the value
of sand and gravel when it passed the Act.379  Thus, the plurality
373. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. 176 (No. 02-1593).
Specifically, the question was raised concerning the limits placed upon the mineral estate holder
and whether he or she can extract anything they would like. Id. Thomas Sansonetti, the
government lawyer arguing the case, stated "Maybe the sand and gravel are the-the poor
stepchildren to brother gold and-and sister silver, but they're just as valuable as a member of the
mineral family." Id.
374. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 328, at 30-32. This section is entitled "Even If
There Is A Difference Between 'Minerals' and 'Valuable Minerals,' Sand And Gravel Were
'Valuable Minerals' When The Pittman Act Was Enacted." Id. at 30. This section specifically
addresses the question the plurality chose to answer in its opinion. See BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at
184 (defining the issue as whether Congress thought sand and gravel were valuable minerals
when it enacted the Pittman Act).
375. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 328, at 30.
376. Id. See also supra note 306 (noting that $24 million in 1914 is equivalent to $423
million today).
377. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 328, at 31. The Department noted the production
of sand and gravel was "unprecedentedly large," that "[a]ll kinds of sands increased in total value,
and most of them increased in quantity," and that "[f]rom many parts of the country it was
reported by producers that they could not get enough men to operate at the desired capacity or
enough cars to meet their requirements." Id.
378. Id. at 32. The four non-metallic minerals with a larger value were petroleum, natural gas,
coal and stone. Id. In 1917, the government pegged the value of the sand and gravel industry at
$37 million. Id. This figure amounts to a 54% growth in a matter of three years. Compare id.
(stating the value of the sand gravel industry in 1917 was $37 million) with supra note 376
(showing in 1914, sand and gravel was a $24 million industry). As a matter of reference, the
National Stone, Sand & Gravel Association states the industry sold over three billion tons of the
substance in 2003, contributing $37.5 billion to America's GDP. Nat'l Stone, Sand & Gravel
Ass'n, What is NSSGA?, http://www.nssga.org/communications/whoweare.cfm (last visited
January 7, 2005).
379. See Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. 295, 309 (1997) (citing 53 CONG. REC. S707 (1916)
(discussing a floor debate between Senator Pittman and Senator Thomas)). In this debate,
Senator Thomas noted the bill "provides that the Government shall retain tide to virtually
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mischaracterized the Government's position as not contesting the
proposition that sand and gravel were not valuable minerals when
Congress passed the Pittman Act. 380  Instead, the plurality should have
explained that the term "valuable" requires more than simple
commercial marketability required under the General Mining Act.
81
Thus, the Government needed to be much more persuasive in this area,
possibly by citing specific Interior Department rulings after the Act was
passed as an illustration of how difficult the Act is to interpret.
382
B. The Plurality Opinion Should Have Found the Statute's Mineral
Reservation Provision Ambiguous on an As-Applied Basis
The plurality predicated its decision on the fact that the Pittman Act's
language was not ambiguous. 3 83  In making this determination, the
plurality rejected the idea that sand and gravel are in fact "valuable
minerals" because of their present commercial market value and used its
decision in Amoco v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe as justification for its
position.3 84  Instead, based on Amoco, the plurality noted the propermethod of analysis was to determine whether the materials were
everything except the surface of the ground and such rights as are inseparable from its use for
agricultural purposes." Id. Furthermore, the sponsors of the bill expressly debated sand and
gravel. Id.
380. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (2004).
381. See United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968) (discussing the history of the
marketability test); supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court has
come close to adopting a marketability test for determining "valuable mineral deposits" under the
mining laws).
382. See, e.g., Susan J. Kayler, 162 I.B.L.A. 245 (2004) (arguing that the mineral estate owner
must be allowed to prospect and mine insofar as it is reasonably incident to obtaining the
minerals); Sierra Club, 156 I.B.L.A. 144 (2002) (concerning BLM compliance with the National
Historic Preservation Act, National Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered Species Act);
Am. Colloid Co., 154 I.B.L.A. 7 (2000) (stating that mining claims cannot be located on lands
patented under the Stock Raising Homestead Act until a person who intends to enter the lands to
explore or locate a mining claim has first filed a notice of intent to locate with the proper BLM
state office and served a copy of that notice upon the surface owners of record); Kenneth Snow,
153 I.B.L.A. 371 (2000) (finding that unauthorized extraction and/or removal of mineral
materials from public lands is an act of trespass); Mt. Gaines Consol., 144 I.B.L.A. 49 (1998)
(stating that mining claims cannot be located on lands patented under the Stock Raising
Homestead Act until the claimant has first filed a notice of intent to locate with the proper BLM
state office and served a copy of the notice upon the surface owner of record); Maurice Tanner,
141 I.B.L.A. 373 (1997) (finding that where there is a dispute as to whether a mineral resource is
included in a patent issued under the Stock Raising Homestead Act, the determination should be
made in light of the use of the surface estate that Congress contemplated and the manner in which
the material is extracted and used).
383. See BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 183-84 (stating "we think the term 'valuable' makes clear
that Congress did not intend to include sand and gravel in the Pittman Act's mineral
reservation").
384. Id. at 1594. See also supra Part H.G.4 (discussing the Amoco decision).
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valuable at the time the enabling Act was passed. The Amoco ruling
did not extend a reservation of "coal" to include CBM gas on the
grounds that the gas became commercially viable decades after
Congress enacted the land grant statute at issue.386 While the plurality
seemed to find the harvesting of CBM gas and the harvesting of sand
and gravel analogous, sand and gravel harvesting did have a commerical
market in the 1910s-the government even federalized its production
during World War 1.387 Thus, from one point of view, sand and gravel
should be considered a "valuable mineral" reserved under the Pittman
Act.38
8
On the other hand, sand and gravel are perhaps the most plentiful
substances in a desert, and ones that are found abundantly on the
surface.389 When a patent is issued on a piece of land, the patentee only
receives rights to the surface, which he or she must use for reclamation
or cultivation purposes, 390 and they only receive the land once the
Secretary of the Interior conducts and inspection and classifies the land
as not containing valuable minerals and as non-mineral in character.
391
Therefore, a question arises regarding how sand and gravel, abundant
on the surface of land, can be considered a "valuable mineral" when the
Secretary of the Interior has conducted an inspection of the land and
certified that he does not believe the land contains "valuable
minerals." 392 The Government attempted to clarify this ambiguity in
oral argument by separating the determination of what constitutes a
"valuable mineral" for the purposes of classification with what
constitutes a "valuable mineral" for the purposes of reservation.
393
However, at best, this response demonstrates the ambiguity of the
385. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 186.
386. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 873-880 (1999).
387. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 328, at 32 (stating that in 1918 and "because of the
,exigencies of war,' the 'entire output of some sand and gravel was commandeered by the
Government"').
388. See id. (suggesting the decision to commandeer the industry could imply that the
Government had recognized the "value" in the harvesting of the sand and gravel).
389. UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES: 2005, 140-
43 (2005) (discussing the wide commercial use of sand and gravel in the United States).
390. Pittman Act, Pub. L. No. 66-60, § 3, 41 Stat. 293-95 (1919), repealed in part by Pub. L.
No. 88-417, 78 Stat. 389 (1964); see also Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. 295, 313 (1997)
(discussing the legislative history and intent of the Pittman Act).
391. Pittman Act, § 2, 41 Stat. at 294 (1919); see also supra Part II.B (discussing the
mechanics of the Pittman Act).
392. Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. at 313. At the Board of Land Appeals, Earl Williams noted
in his Statement of Reasons that on October 2, 1934, the Director of the Interior Department's
Geological Survey certified the land was in fact non-mineral in character. Id.
393. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 373, at 44-45.
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Pittman Act and, under the rules of statutory interpretation, requires the
Court to look into the leoislative history and Congressional intent of
enacting the Pittman Act. A 4 Instead, the plurality chose to bypass this
analysis by its repeated insistence that the Pittman Act's reservation
provision was unambiguous. 395  This is a significant departure,
considering every court or administrative agency charged with
evaluating the legislative history of the Pittman Act had found the
mineral reservation provision ambiguous but nonetheless reserved sand
and gravel.396
C. Justice Stevens Ignores the Statutory Canon that Proper Statutory
Interpretation Gives Meaning to ALL Words Used
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens explicitly states the terms
"minerals" and "valuable minerals" found in the Pittman Act's enabling
clause are intended to be interchangeable and synonymous. 397 As such,
he found the Western Nuclear case controlling and the sand and gravel
reserved to the government. 398 In making this determination, he stated
that no policy reason existed for Congress to include a different
reservation provision in the Pittman Act as they did in the SRHA.399
While Justice Stevens did note the well established need for certainty
and predictability in land titles,4°° he did not address the well
394. See supra Part .E (discussing the method by which ambiguous statutes are interpreted
under Supreme Court precedents).
395. See, e.g., BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183-84 (2004) ("We think the term
'valuable' makes clear that Congress did not intend to include sand and gravel in the Pittman
Act's mineral reservation."). "[W]e readily conclude that the 'most natural interpretation' of the
mineral reservation does not encompass sand and gravel.... Because we have held that the text
of the statutory reservation clearly excludes sand and gravel, we have no occasion to resort to
legislative history." Id. at 186.
396. See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 314 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 176
(2004) (holding that sand and gravel are econmpassed by the reservation of "valuable minerals"
to the United States); BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (D. Nev. 1999), afftd,
314 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 176 (2004) (holding that sand and gravel deposits
are the reserved property of the United States); Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. 295 (1997) (reserving
sand and gravel to the government).
397. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 189-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote "the
term 'mineral' or 'minerals' appears eight times in § 8 of the Pittman Act, and only twice it is
modified by the adjective 'valuable,' strongly suggesting that the terms 'valuable minerals' and
'minerals' were intended to be synonymous." Id. at 191.
398. Id. at 191.
399. Id.; see also supra note 358 and accompanying text (according to Justice Stevens, the
Western Nuclear test would also require that a mineral be "valuable," i.e., able to be used for
commercial purposes).
400. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Leo Sheep v. United States,
440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979) (finding that the government did not have free access rights to land
without compensating the property owner, and that "[the Supreme Court] has traditionally
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established doctrine that proper statutory interpretation requires that all
words in a statute be given effect.4° 1 If Justice Stevens had attempted to
find meaning in the term "valuable," he would likely have encountered
great difficulty pinning down a specific meaning. 4 02  Had Justice
Stevens explored the meanings for the phrase advocated by the two
parties, he could have concluded that the statute was ambiguous and
either affirmed the Ninth Circuit on the grounds that any ambiguity in
the land grant statute must be resolved in favor of the government 403 or
explored the legislative history in order to determine congressional
intent in the reservation as the other courts resolving this dispute had
done. 40 4  Instead, Justice Stevens simply scoffed at the plurality's
failure to conduct the analysis and cited to an Israeli Supreme Court
Justice for the principle that sorting through the history of a piece of
legislation will keep judges' personal opinions out of statutory
recognized the special need for certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned and
[was] unwilling to upset settled expectations to accommodate some ill-defined power to construct
public thoroughfares without compensation")).
401. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)
(requiring the court to give meaning to every phrase in a statute provided the interpretation does
not arrive at an absurd result); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (interpreting the
word "use" in a federal sentencing law regarding handgun crimes); supra Part III.E (discussing
the proper method of statutory interpretation). In Bailey, the Court noted that statutory
interpretation will be predicated on the assumption that Congress meant to give each word in a
statute meaning. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145. When courts are confronted with interpreting a specific
word, the court may look toward the placement of the word, the purpose of the overall statutory
scheme, and most importantly, the ordinary and common meaning of the word if it is not defined
elsewhere in the statute. Id.
402. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Stevens devotes
the dissenting opinion's only footnote to showing the phrase "valuable" has been very difficult to
define. Id. (citing Watt v. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1983) (stating mineral reservations
must encourage both surface and subsurface development and should not be interpreted to
interfere with substances that can be taken from the topsoil); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188
U.S. 526, 536-37 (1903) (stating mineral lands include all such lands chiefly valuable for their
deposits in the arts or manufacturing); United States v. Isabell Constr., 78 Interior Dec. 385, 390
(1971) (allowing a reservation only if the substance has a separate value apart from the soil); 1
AM. L. OF MINING § 3.26 (1982) (stating a mineral reservation should be considered to sever
from the surface all mineral substances which can be taken from the soil and which have a
separate value)).
403. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 59; Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prod. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617
(1978); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957); Caldwell v. United
States, 250 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1919); Soderberg, 188 U.S. at 534 (all holding that ambiguities in
land grant statutes must be resolved in favor of the government).
404. See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 314 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 176
(2004); BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (D. Nev. 1999), affd, 314 F.3d 1080
(9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 176 (2004); Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. 295 (1997) (all using the
legislative history of the Pittman Act to conclude sand and gravel were reserved to the
government under section 8).
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interpretation. 405
D. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion Arrives at the Best Resolution
of the Matter
The opinion authored by Justice Thomas employed the traditional
method of statutory interpretation by giving all words meaning, and
properly criticized the Western Nuclear decision and limited its
reach. Justice Thomas, like Justice Stevens, recognized that section 8
employed both the phrases "mineral(s)" and "valuable mineral(s)" and
that the reservation provision of the Pittman Act cannot be meaningfully
distinguished from the SRHA. 40 7 The concurrence, however, suggested
that each phrase should be given meaning by noting the plurality
interpreted the term "minerals" too broadly to include sand and gravel
but also read the term "valuable" too narrowly to mandate a commercial
purpose requirement.4 08 Justice Thomas also noted the error in Western
Nuclear's logic that sand and gravel are "minerals" under the SRHA
because at the time of passage, they could have hypothetically been
used for commercial purposes. 4 09  Instead, Justice Thomas noted the
statutory context of the SRHA should not be read to include sand and
gravel as valuable minerals and also argued the Pittman Act, which
contains slightly different but functionally equivalent language, should
also be read to exclude sand and gravel as valuable minerals.4 10  But,
405. See supra notes 356-63 and accompanying text (outlining Justice Stevens's
characterization of the plurality opinion as headstrong and deliberately uninformed).
406. BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 187-89 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Part III.E.2
(summarizing Justice Thomas's concurrence).
407. BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 187 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote "I agree
with Justice Stevens that the mineral reservation provision in the [Pittman Act] cannot be
meaningfully distinguished from the analogous provision in the [SRHA]." Id.
408. Id. In a footnote, Justice Thomas noted the Western Nuclear court suggested a narrower
definition of "mineral" stating that "Congress plainly contemplated that mineral deposits on
SRHA lands would be subject to location under the mining laws." Id. at 188 (citing W. Nuclear,
462 U.S. at 51). Under this method of analysis, Justice Thomas noted that only valuable mineral
deposits would be reserved to the government. Id.
409. Id. at 187. It is important to note that both Justice Thomas who authored the
concurrence, and Justice Breyer who joined him were not on the bench when the Court decided
Western Nuclear. See Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, List of Justices of the Supreme Court
of the United States, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_- Court-Justice (last visited Oct. 8,
2005) (indicating Justice Breyer was appointed in 1994 and that Justice Thomas was appointed in
1991). Justices Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor served on the Court when the Western Nuclear
decision came down from the bench in 1983. Id.
410. BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 189 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas likely relied
upon a requirement of both acts that the Secretary certify the land as non-mineral in character and
as not known to contain any valuable minerals. See Pittman Act, Pub. L. No. 66-60, § 2, 41 Stat.
293-95 (1919), repealed in part by Pub. L. No. 88-417, 78 Stat. 389 (1964); SRHA, § 2, 43
U.S.C. § 292 (repealed 1976) (explaining the requirements for the Secretary).
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like the plurality, Justice Thomas noted the principle of stare decisis
and its heightened importance in property law and declined to overrule
Western Nuclear, but instead limit the Court's holding to the SRHA.4 1
1
V. IMPACT
While the Pittman Act only applied to a rather small number of land
permits in a single state, the significance of BedRoc Ltd. v. United
States has already been illustrated.4 12  Specifically, the impact of the
decision will be analyzed in four discrete areas. First, this Part will
address the impact of the decision from the viewpoint of a legislator and
illustrate that the Court now requires lawmakers to be far more precise
in their wording. 413 Second, it will show that the opinion suggests that
under the right circumstances, the Court may be willing to overturn the
Western Nuclear decision.4 14  Then, this Part will address the specific
impact the decision will have in the areas of construction and
environmental law.4 15  Finally, this Part will explore the role the
decision will play in what could be the next great congressional public
land grant-permits for exploratory oil drilling in the Alaskan National
Wildlife Reserve. 4 16 This subject has consistently been one of the most
hotly contested political debates in recent memory with some members
of Congress stating the outcome will have serious ramifications in the
areas of national security, the environment, the economy, and even the
very principles of federalism. 417
411. BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 189 (Thomas, J., concurring).
412. Nevada Sand and Gravel Case Defines U.S. Land Grant Law, ENGINEERINGG NEWS-
REC., Apr. 12, 2004, at 15. "The decision in [BedRoc Ltd.] is narrow and specifically affects only
about 8,500 acres." Id. The newspaper quotes an attorney who represents the National Stone,
Sand & Gravel Association who stated: "[The BedRoc Ltd. decision] has much broader
implications .... The issue comes up again and again. The government is trying to back out of
the deal it made 100 years ago." Id.
413. See infra Part V.A (discussing the case from the legislator's point of view).
414. See infra Part V.B (demonstrating the Court could overturn Western Nuclear if it is given
the right case). With the retirement of Justice O'Connor, who sided with the plurality, the death
of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and the appointment of Chief Justice Roberts, this becomes an even
greater possibility.
415. See infra Part V.C (showing the particular application of BedRoc Ltd. in cases already
subjudice).
416. See infra Part V.D. (discussing ANWR and BedRoc Ltd.'s potential application).
417. See, e.g., Republican Calls ANWR First Priority, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 7,
2005, at B2; Pombo Makes ANWR Priority, THE OIL DAILY, Jan. 7, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 899173 (showing both the Senate and House Committee Chairmen with jurisdiction over
ANWR have identified the issue as a priority item on their agenda).
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A. Legislatures Must Choose Their Words Carefully and Should Define
Potentially Ambiguous Phrases
The BedRoc Ltd. decision fits in a series of cases decided by the
Court in its October 2003 term in which the proper meaning of a
statutory provision was before the Court.418  In all of these cases, the
Court adopted a narrow view of the statutory provision at issue, leading
some commentators to characterize the term as an exercise in judicial
restraint.4 19 In all of these cases, the Supreme Court not only refused to
find any of the statutes ambiguous, 42  but also went further by stating
that even if a statute is awkward and poorly written, it still can be
unambiguous on an as-applied basis.4 2 1  Only in Household Credit v.
418. See Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S, Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756 (2004)
(interpreting the Clean Air Act); Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 124 S. Ct. 1741 (2004)
(interpreting the Truth in Lending Act); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 124 S. Ct. 1023 (2004)
(interpreting an attorney's fee provision of the bankruptcy code).
419. See Charles H. Whitebread, The Rule of Law, Judicial Self-Restraint, and Unanswered
Questions: Decisions of the United States Supreme Court's 2003-2004 Term, 26 WHITTIER L.
REv. 101 (2004) (summarizing the major decisions issued by the Supreme Court in the last term);
Charles H. Whitebread, Significant Pronouncements of the High Court, ORANGE COUNTY LAW.,
Dec. 2004, at 14 (noting the October 2003 term made significant pronouncements on federalism,
presidential power, elections, and civil statutory power). In Engine Manufacturers, a trade
association representing diesel engine companies challenged the validity of state imposed Fleet
Rules that generally prohibit the purchase or lease of vehicles that do not meet stringent emission
requirements, on the grounds that the regulations were pre-empted by section 209(a) of the
Federal Clean Air Act. Engine Mfrs., 124 S. Ct. at 1759. This section prohibits states from
imposing or enforcing any state or local "standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines." Clean Air Act, § 209(a) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (West 2000) (cited in Engine Mfrs., 124 S. Ct. at 1760)). The Supreme
Court faced the task of determining section 209(a)'s meaning of the word "standard" as the
district court took the opinion that the word applied only to regulations that compelled
manufacturers to meet certain limits. Engine Mfrs., 124 S. Ct. at 1761. In Lamie, an attorney
challenged whether he was entitled to attorney's fees in a case that began under Chapter 11 but
was later transferred to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code because the statutory provision
awarding him fees was unintentionally left out of an amendment to the Code. Lamie, 124 S. Ct.
at 1027. Prior to 1994, the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code expressly allowed the court to award "to
a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this
title or to the debtor's attorney-(l) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services
rendered by such trustee." Id. In 1994, the Code was amended and the five words "or to the
debtor's attorney" were unintentionally left out of the new version. Id. As a result of this
deletion, circuits have been split on its effect and the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the
split. Id. at 1028.
420. Engine Mfrs., 124 S. Ct. at 1761 (requiring "statutory construction [to] begin with the
language employed by Congress and [the] assumption that [the] ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."); BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 124 S. Ct.
1587, 1594 (2004) ("The proper inquiry focuses on the ordinary meaning of the reservation at the
time Congress enacted it."); Lamie, 540 U.S' at 534 ("It is well established that 'when the
statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at least where the disposition required
by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms."')
421. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534 ("The statute is awkward, and even ungrammatical, but that does
2005] Sand Wars
Pfennig,4 22 when the Court was confronted with a statute and a
corresponding, potentially contradictory, administrative regulation did it
rule that the statute was ambiguous.423 In Household Credit, the Court
had to determine whether an exclusion provision in Regulation Z4 2 4
conflicted with a section of the Truth in Lending Act425 requiring the
disclosure of "finance charges" by credit companies. 426  The Court
concluded that the statute was ambiguous, thus allowing the Federal
Reserve Board's regulation to stand unless the regulation was found to
be procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious. 427 While the Court
did find this statute ambiguous, it found the regulation unambiguous
and controlling. 428 Thus, the Court did not consult legislative history in
any of these cases.
4 29
not make it ambiguous on the point at issue.").
422. Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 124 S. Ct. 1741, 1741 (2004).
423. Id. at 1750.
424. Regulation Z, Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c) (2005) states:
Charges excluded from the finance charge. The following charges are not finance
charges:
(1) Application fees charged to all applicants for credit, whether or not credit is
actually extended.
(2) Charges for actual unanticipated late payment, for exceeding a credit limit, or for
delinquency, default, or a similar occurrence. (3) Charges imposed by a financial
institution for paying items that overdraw an account, unless the payment of such items
and the imposition of the charge were previously agreed upon in writing. (4) Fees
charged for participation in a credit plan, whether assessed on an annual or other
periodic basis. (5) Seller's points. (6) Interest forfeited as a result of an interest
reduction required by law on a time deposit used as security for an extension of credit.
(7) Real-estate related fees. The following fees in a transaction secured by real property
or in a residential mortgage transaction, if the fees are bona fide and reasonable in
amount... (8) Discounts offered to induce payment for a purchase by cash, check, or
other means, as provided in section 167(b) of the act.
Id.
425. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000 & West Supp. 2005). This section
defines a "finance charge" as:
Any consumer credit transaction shall be determined as the sum of all charges, payable
directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit is extended, and imposed
directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit. The
finance charge does not include charges of a type payable in a comparable cash
transaction. The finance charge shall not include fees and amounts imposed by third
party closing agents (including settlement agents, attorneys, and escrow and title
companies) if the creditor does not require the imposition of the charges or the services
provided and does not retain the charges.
Id.
426. Household Credit, 124 S. Ct. at 1744.
427. Id. at 1748 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)).
428. Id.
429. See supra notes 419 and accompanying text (indicating that the court did not consult
legislative history).
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These decisions send a strong message to all those drafting statutory
text-the courts will assume a legislature meant to draft a statute in the
manner it appears in the law books.430 The BedRoc Ltd. decision came
down on March 31, 2004.431 By the close of 2004, the decision had
already been used by two state supreme courts, three United States
Courts of Appeals and in a subsequent United States Supreme Court
opinion. 432 In the first half of 2005, four additional circuits have joined
in holding that the BedRoc Ltd. decision mandates a textual analysis of
statutory language before any extrinsic evidence may be considered.433
These courts used the BedRoc Ltd. decision not for its principles in
mineral law, but rather for its statutory interpretation framework.4 34
Furthermore, these cases involved a wide variety of matters and
illustrate the BedRoc Ltd. decision has already proven to have a
significant impact on a wide variety of federal, state and municipal
laws.435  Consider the fact that in 1999 the Court interpreted a
reservation provision by considering legislative history and the
"contemplations of Congress." 436 Five years later, the same Court with
no change in membership, outright rejected the use of legislative history
to interpret a similarly dated reservation provision on the grounds it
would be a "backdoor" to the policy preferences of the particular
judges. 43 7
430. See, e.g., BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (2004) (describing this
principle as the "preeminent canon of statutory interpretation").
431. Id. at 176.
432. Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2292 (2004); Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, 370 F.3d 124,
135 (1st Cir. 2004); Olden v. Lafarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 2004); Avendano-
Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004); Mayor of Lansing v. Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 680 N.W.2d 840, 851 (Mich. 2004) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); State ex rel. Lee v.
Karnes, 817 N.E.2d 76, 81 (Ohio 2004); State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 815 N.E.2d 1107, 1113
(Ohio 2004) (courts citing the BedRoc Ltd. decision by the end of 2004).
433. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, 402 F.3d 325, 329 (2d Cir. 2005); Howard Delivery Servs.
v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 403 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2005); Ashley v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 408
F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005); Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1332
(11 th Cir. 2005) (courts holding that the BedRoc Ltd. decision mandates a textual analysis before
any extrinsic evidence may be considered).
434. See, e.g., Ortega, 370 F.3d at 135 (citing the BedRoc Ltd. decision for the principle that
all statutory interpretations begin with a discussion of the text of the statute); Morrissey, 815
N.E.2d at 1113 (citing BedRoc Ltd. as standing for the proposition that when the court encounters
an unambiguous statute, it must apply the statute and avoid construing it).
435. Compare Avendano-Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 813 (dealing with the definition of "good
moral character" in the immigration law), with Mayor of Lansing, 680 N.W.2d at 840 (concerning
whether a piping company had to seek approval from a Michigan mayor to construct a 26-mile
gas pipeline).
436. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 880 (1999).
437. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187 (2004).
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B. The BedRoc Ltd. Court Opens the Door to a Rethinking of What
Constitutes a "Mineral" Under the Mining and Land Grant Acts and to
a Possible Overturning of Western Nuclear
While the above cases demonstrate the wide application of the
BedRoc Ltd. decision to statutory law, they do not address the
application of the case to mineral law. BedRoc Ltd.'s plurality
recognized a potential flaw in the Western Nuclear decision but did not
overrule the case on the grounds that BedRoc Ltd. and Western Nuclear
dealt with different statutes, each with slightly different language.4 38 In
both the dissenting and concurring opinions, the Justices explicitly
noted the errors of Western Nuclear but also declined to overrule it in
order to preserve land titles. 439 Since all of the Justices agree that the
Western Nuclear decision is flawed, the Court may be willing to
overturn the decision if it receives the right case.
440
In 2002, the Tenth Circuit decided Rosette v. United States, which
relied heavily upon the determination in Western Nuclear, and held
geothermal steam was included in the mineral reservation provision of
the SRHA. 44 1 Two years later in the BedRoc Ltd. case, every Justice of
the United States Supreme Court seriously questioned the method of
analysis employed by the Western Nuclear court.44 2  Had the Rosette
case been decided after the BedRoc Ltd. decision, it is likely the Court
would have ruled geothermal steam is not a mineral reserved to the
government.4 43 Under the ordinary and popular meaning approach of
the BedRoc Ltd. Court, the Court could have easily arrived at the
conclusion that steam, a gaseous substance, is not a "mineral," a word
typically associated with solid substances. 444
If the Court were to decide to overturn Western Nuclear, it would
438. Id. at 183 ("Whatever the correctness of Western Nuclear's broad construction of the
term 'minerals,' we are not free to so expansively interpret the Pittman Act's reservation.").
439. Id. at 188-89 (Thomas, J., concurring). "I disagree, however, with the Court's conclusion
in Western Nuclear that sand and gravel are 'minerals' under the SRHA." Id. at 191-92 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). "The policy of including sand and gravel in the reservation may well be unwise,
and, indeed, the majority in Western Nuclear may have misinterpreted Congress' intent in 1916."
Id. at 192.
440. See supra Part IV (analyzing the Justices' opinions as they pertain to Western Nuclear).
441. Rosette v. United States, 277 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
878 (2002). See also supra Part H.G.5 (outlining the Rosette decision).
442. See supra notes 438-40 and accompanying text (describing the reactions of the Justices
to Western Nuclear in the BedRoc Ltd. case).
443. Cf BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 176; Rosette, 277 F.3d at 1222.
444. BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 184. "In interpreting statutory mineral reservations like the
one at issue here, we have emphasized that Congress 'was dealing with a practical subject in a
practical way' and that it intended the terms of reservation to be understood in their ordinary and
popular sense." Id.
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seriously undermine the consistency in land titles that all the BedRoc
Ltd. Justics thg e.ss 1. e n . 445  Thus, the Court, must be willing to
construct new property rights to replace the SRHA.4 6 Commentators
have described the common law of reservation and retention as having
three broad themes: (1) favoring the government's interest over the
interests of private parties, (2) providing the national government with
primary control over public lands, as opposed to state and local
governments and (3) supporting the concerns of protectionism and
environmental conservation over development concerns.447  The
BedRoc Ltd. Court chipped away at the first theme by resolving a
legitimate mineral rights dispute in favor of a private party and against
the government.448 While BedRoc Ltd. never addressed the validity of
the first theme, the decision might be the first step toward re-writing the
common law of mineral rights in a way that would favor private
parties. 4
49
C. BedRoc Ltd. Has Already Played a Role in Construction and
Environmental Law
Since Williams and BedRoc began extracting sand and gravel for use
in the booming Las Vegas construction industry,450 it is not surprising
that the construction industry would react favorably to a verdict in favor
of BedRoc. 451 Thus, as the issue was pending before the court, several
construction trade associations filed amici curiae briefs in support of the
petitioner.452 After the verdict was announced, these groups proclaimed
445. See, e.g., id. at 189 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the concern over stare decisis should
be at its highest when property and contract rights are involved).
446. Id.
447. John D. Leshy, A Property Clause for the Twenty-First Century, 75 U. COLO. L. REv.
1101, 1106 (2004) (summarizing the themes of common law land management).
448. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 180-81 (plurality opinion).
449. Leshy, supra note 447, at 1108-09 (illustrating recent Supreme Court decisions that have
given private parties greater rights in mineral rights disputes). Aside from BedRoc Ltd., Leshy
notes the Leo Sheep case. Id. In Leo Sheep, the Court rejected the government's claim that it had
reserved a right of way across land it granted to a railroad on the grounds the facts and
circumstances of the case did not support the application of the canon that ambiguities in land
grants are to be construed in favor of the government. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S.
668, 683 (1979).
450. BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 1591-92. See also supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text
(discussing some of Las Vegas's significant construction projects of the time).
451. Mayer, Brown, Roe & Maw, LLP, Supreme Court Docket Report, October Term 2003, at
4, http://www.appellate.net/docketreports/pdf/docketreportl-2003.pdf (last visited September 14,
2005) (describing the BedRoc Ltd. decision as significant because "[it] may be applied to other
grants of federal land" and "may also affect other businesses across the western United States that
extract sand and gravel or rely on their abundant supply for construction projects").
452. Brief Amicus Curiae of Nat'l Stone, Sand and Gravel Ass'n in Support of Petitioners and
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victory and noted the ruling would save a modest producer $125,000 in
government fees. 453 This Section will discuss specific cases which have
been impacted by the BedRoc Ltd. decision in the construction and
environmental arena.
454
1. Mayor of Lansing v. Michigan Public Service Commission
An example of BedRoc Ltd.'s application in the construction industry
can be found in a decision by the Michigan Supreme Court.455  In
Mayor of Lansing v. Michigan Public Service Commission,456 a
construction company received state but not city approval to drill and
install twenty-six miles of pipeline adjacent to an interstate highway.
457
Prior to the start of work, the mayor's office intervened and demanded
the project first receive city approval before going to the appropriate
state administrative agency for final approval. As justification, the
city relied upon a Michigan statute stating that this type of work must
receive city approval "before any work of this is commenced. 459 In
resolving this dispute, the court stayed close to the statute and refused to
entertain policy arguments or consult any legislative history.460 Just as
Urging Reversal at 1, BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (2004) (No. 02-1593), 2003
WL 22766728; Brief of Amici Curiae, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. et al. at 1-5, BedRoc
Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (2004) (No. 02-1593), 2003 WL 22733917 (urging reversal
and joined by the Associated General Contractors of California, Associated General Contractors
of Alaska, Colorado Contractors Association, Montana Contractors Association, Wyoming Stock
Growers Association, and Wyoming Stock Growers Agricultural Land Trust).
453. Gus Edwards, Court Decisions Save NSSGA Producer Members $100,000, NAT'L
STONE, SAND & GRAVEL ASS'N E-DIGEsT, Apr. 27, 2004, available at
http://www.nssga.org/newsletter/digest/0427web.htm#3.
454. Infra Part V.C.1-3.
455. Mayor of Lansing v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 680 N.W.2d 840 (Mich. 2004).
456. Id.
457. Id. at 842.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 843 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 247.183(1) (West 2004)). This statute
states in full:
Telegraph, telephone, power, and other public utility companies, cable television
companies, and municipalities may enter upon, construct, and maintain telegraph,
telephone, or power lines, pipe lines, wires, cables, poles, conduits, sewers or similar
structures upon, over, across, or under any public road, bridge, street, or public place,
including, subject to subsection (2), longitudinally within limited access highway
rights-of-way, and across or under any of the waters in this state, with all necessary
erections and fixtures for that purpose. A telegraph, telephone, power, and other public
utility company, cable television company, and municipality, before any of this work is
commenced, shall first obtain the consent of the governing body of the city, village, or
township through or along which these lines and poles are to be constructed and
maintained.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 247.183(1) (West 2004).
460. Mayor of Lansing, 640 N.W.2d at 844. In this case, the mayor presented an argument
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the BedRoc Ltd. case had a vigorous dissent authored by Justice Stevens
and cautioned the plurality on the potential ramifications of their strict
methodology, Justice Cavanagh of the Michigan Supreme Court also
cautioned this approach by quoting Justice Stevens's concerns.
461
2. Ashley v. United States Department of Interior
Ashley v. United States Department of Interior462 centered around the
dispute between the Interior Department and a group of Crow Creek
Sioux Indians regarding the use of funds paid as a result of the Crow
Creek Sioux Tribe Infrastructure and Development Trust Fund Act of
1996463 and a subsequent amendment 464 to the Act.465 The 1996 Act
required the Interior Department to make periodic payments to the
Crow Creek Sioux Indian Tribe and required the tribe to submit a plan
for its use to the Department.466 The Act also required the plan to allot
money for the construction of an educational facility, a health facility
and a water system.467  Between the passage of the Act and the 2000
Amendment, the tribe issued bonds to fund land purchases, consolidated
its loans and sold bonds underwritten by a private investment bank.468
Members of the tribe brought suit against the government, the bond
underwriter and the bond purchaser (but not the Indian tribe) seeking
rescission of the deal on the grounds the payments to the bond
purchaser were not authorized by the 1996 Act.469 The tribal members
suggesting the court must rule in his favor from a policy standpoint. Id. The court responded to
this argument by noting "[w]e have observed many times in the past that our Legislature is free to
make policy choices that, especially in controversial matters, some observers will inevitably think
unwise. This dispute over the wisdom of a law, however, cannot give warrant to a court to
overrule the people's Legislature." Id.
461. Id. at 851 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (quoting BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 1598 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence
unconstrained, increases the risk that the judge's own policy preferences will affect the decisional
process."))
462. Ashley v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 408 F.3d 977, 999 (8th Cir. 2005).
463. Pub. L. No. 104-223, 110 Stat. 3026 (1996) (calling for government approval for certain
transfers of tribal funds).
464. Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contract Encouragement Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-179, § 2, 114 Stat. 46,46-47 (2000) (narrowing the approval provision of 28 U.S.C. § 81
to only contracts that "encumbers Indian lands for a period of 7 or more years."). Interestingly,
the BedRoc Ltd. decision and the Ashley decision both dealt with not widely applicable Interior
statutes. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1587 (2004); Ashley, 408 F.3d at 997.
465. Ashley, 408 F.3d at 999.
466. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 104-223, §§ 4(d)(2), 5).
467. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 104-223, § 5).
468. Id. As part of the bond sale, the tribe agreed to assign its rights to the trust fund payments
to the purchaser. Id. The government gave its official approval and began making payments
directly to the purchaser. Id.
469. Id.
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sought to rescind based on a number of grounds, including 25 U.S.C. §
464, which prohibits the sale or other transfer of "restricted Indian lands
or of shares in the assets of an Indian tribe or corporation [organized
under the Indian Reorganization Act]" unless in a narrow context that
also requires approval from the Interior Department. 470  The tribal
members made the argument that the trust fund payments constituted a
transfer of "shares in assets" and hence, must be voided as a violation of
section 464.471
In evaluating this argument, the court used BedRoc Ltd. for the
proposition that the text of the statute must be consulted first and the
words used must be given their ordinary meaning. 4 72 Hence, the court
consulted Black's Law Dictionary to determine the meaning of "share"
as having an ownership component 473 and an IRS determination that
trust payments do not constitute a transfer of shares so long as the payee
does not take an ownership interest or a right to control in the
underlying trust fund.4 7 4 Hence, the court allowed the Indian tribe to
keep its construction financing arrangement in place. 475 In short, both
the Ashley and Mayor of Lansing decisions serve as two very different
examples of the role the BedRoc Ltd. decision has played in
construction law.4 7
6
3. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management
The BedRoc Ltd. decision has also begun to play a role in
environmental law cases.4 77  In Southern Utah Wilderness, two
470. Id. at 1001 (emphasis added) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 464).
471. Id. at 1001-02.
472. Id. at 1001. In addition to the BedRoc Ltd. decision, the court also made reference to a
1985 Supreme Court case, Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985) (stating "it is
appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress employed
'accurately expresses the legislative purpose."'). In Mills Music, the Court was asked to interpret
§ 304 of the Copyright Act of 1909 in order to resolve a dispute between two heirs of the author
composing the song "Who's Sorry Now." Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 154-56.
473. Ashley, 408 F.3d at 1001. Specifically, Black's Law Dictionary defines "share" as "part
or definite portion of a thing owned by a number of persons in common... and has reference to
that part of the undivided interest which belongs to some one of them." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1990).
474. Yonadi v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1052 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 21 F.3d
1292 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that trust payments do not amount to transferring of shares if payee
does not have ownership rights in primary trust fund).
475. Ashley, 408 F.3d at 1002. The court also rejected all of the plaintiffs' additional
substantive arguments before finally concluding that by not suing the Indian tribe, the plaintiffs
did not have standing against the government and other private entities as no harm was suffered
directly by them. Id. at 1002-03.
476. See supra Part V.C (discussing the effect on the construction industry).
477. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Utah
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environmental groups challenged a county's use of federal lands as a
right-of-way for a county highway. 478 At issue was the construction of
Section 2477 of the Federal Land Management Policy Act,4 79 allowing
the Bureau of Land Management to grant rights-of-way for state and
local governments who wish to build highways on Interior Department
lands and requiring the Interior Secretary to consider environmental
impact, economic efficiency, safety, security and state land use policies
before issuing the rights-of-way. 48  The district court granted the
environmental group's request for injunctive relief barring the county481
from continuing its road construction. 1 The BLM and the counties
involved appealed the case to the Tenth Circuit, the disposition of which
is still pending. 482  After the district court ruled in favor of the
environmental groups, the Supreme Court issued its decision in BedRoc
483Ltd. Since both of these cases involved land grant statutes and
procedures, the BedRoc Ltd. case should be considered in ultimately
determining the outcome of Southern Utah's case.484  In fact, the
2001). The other environmental group bringing suit was the Sierra Club. Id. (listing the Sierra
Club as a co-plaintiff).
478. Id. (providing a brief sketch of the controversy). See also Michael J. Wolter, Revised
Statute 2477 Rights-Of-Way Settlement Act: Exorcism or Exercise for the Ghosts of Land Use
Past, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 315 (1996) (illustrating the longevity of this dispute).
479. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (describing the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act).
480. Revised Statute 2477, 43 U.S.C. § 1763 states:
In order to minimize adverse environmental impacts and the proliferation of separate
rights-of-way, the utilization of rights-of-way in common shall be required to the
extent practical, and each right-of-way or permit shall reserve to the Secretary
concerned the right to grant additional rights-of-way or permits for compatible uses on
or adjacent to rights-of-way granted pursuant to this Act. In designating right-of-way
corridors and in determining whether to require that rights-of-way be confined to them,
the Secretary concerned shall take into consideration national and State land use
policies, environmental quality, economic efficiency, national security, safety, and
good engineering and technological practices. The Secretary concerned shall issue
regulations containing the criteria and procedures he will use in designating such
corridors. Any existing transportation and utility corridors may be designated as
transportation and utility corridors pursuant to this subsection without further review.
43 U.S.C. § 1763 (2000 & West Supp. 2005).
481. S. Utah Wilderness, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
482. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 04-4071, 2005 WL 2160136
(10th Cir. Sept. 8, 2005).
483. BedRoc Ltd. was decided on March 31, 2004. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 124 S. Ct.
1587, 1587 (2004). The district court decided Southern Utah Wilderness on June 25, 2001. S.
Utah Wilderness, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
484. Compare BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 1594, with S. Utah Wilderness, 147 F. Supp. 2d at
1133 (using both the FLPMA and the General Mining Act in reaching their conclusions). Not
only do the questions in both acts concern federal land grant policy, but both also require an
analysis of the mining laws. BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 1594 (interpreting the Pittman Act); S.
Utah Wilderness, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1133 (interpreting Revised Statute 2477).
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environmental groups used the case explicitly in its reply brief, which
they argue mandates the method of statutory interpretation that must be
used to resolve their dispute.485  On September 8, 2005, the Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case for a de novo
evidentiary proceeding to determine whether the work performed on the
routes in this case went beyond routine maintenance and thus
constituted trespass.4 86 Thus, as this case progresses into an evidentiary
stage, BedRoc Ltd. will continue to play a role in determining its final
disposition. 487
D. BedRoc Ltd. Will Also Influence the Next Major Government Land
Grant - Exploratory Oil Drilling in the Alaskan National Wildlife
Refuge
Congress and the Executive Branch have been debating a National
Energy Policy for many years.4 88 Perhaps one of the most controversial
aspects of a potential energy policy involves the issue of exploratory oil
drilling in the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), a large
chunk of Northern Alaska owned by the federal government and kept
for preservation. 489  Congress created this refuge in 1980 pursuant to
the Alaska National Interests Lands Conservation Act.490  The entire
refuge lies entirely above the Arctic Circle, constitutes 19 million acres,
making it larger than ten states, and is one of the most sparsely
491populated areas in the world. Immediately to the west of the refuge
lies the Trans-Alaskan Oil Pipeline, a major distribution network for oil
that would also make the production of oil in ANWR economically
485. Appellants' Reply Brief at 1, 24, S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
2004 WL 2466043 (10th Cir. Sept. 16, 2004) (No. 04-4071).
486. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management, Nos. 04-4071, 04-4073
cons., 2005 WL 2160136, at *6 (10th Cir. Sept. 8, 2005).
487. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, The Great R.S. 2477 Land Giveaway,
http://www.suwa.org/entry.php?entry-id=364 (last visited Aug. 7, 2005) (labeling the practice of
applying for these permits as destroying the sanctity of public lands and that the permits are based
on an "archaic federal law enacted in 1866").
488. See generally ROBERT L. BAMBERGER AND CARL E. BERHRENS, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS CODE IB10143, ENERGY POLICY: COMPREHENSIVE ENERGY
LEGISLATION (H.R. 6) IN THE 109TH CONGRESS (2005), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/45212.pdf (outlining the general historical
background of efforts to create a national energy policy and discussing the current House
proposal).
489. See Jeffery H. Wood, Protecting Native Coastal Ecosystems: CZMfA and Alaska's
Coastal Plain, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 57 (2004) (discussing the history of the ANWR debate).
490. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101-3233 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005); see also Wood, supra note 489,
at 57 (noting that Congress created ANWR in 1980).
491. Arctic Power, What is ANWR and Where is the Coastal Plain,
http://www.anwr.org/backgrnd/where.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2005).
2005]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
feasible. 492 Thus, for over a decade, oil companies have been lobbying
Congress and the Executive Branch for permission to engage in
exploratory oil drilling along the northern Coastal Basin, an area that is
roughly eight percent of the total refuge.493  While environmental
groups and energy companies disagree over whether the government
should continue its practice of prohibiting oil companies from engaging
in exploratory drilling, the Bush Administration and leaders of Congress
all staunchly support opening the refuge up for oil drilling.414 In fact,
Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico, Chairman of the Senate Energy
Committee, has vowed to move quickly on authorization for oil drilling
in ANWR, which fell one vote short in the 108th Congress.
495
The BedRoc Ltd. case can provide Congress and the President with a
guide on how to go about ANWR oil drilling.49 6 First, the Roosevelt
land grant statutes can show Congress that concurrent development may
be possible, if it is managed in the right way.497 The BedRoc Ltd. Court
cautions Congress to be explicit in what types of "minerals" the oil
companies may harvest from ANWR and what types of "minerals" are
to be kept as government property.498  In the 1890s, gold was
discovered in the Klondike Mountains, an area near the ANWR.499
Thus, with the past history of discovering "valuable minerals" in the
state, the BedRoc Ltd. case warns Congress to be precise in defining
what explorers can harvest and what they cannot.500  If Congress
defines its patents in an unambiguous manner, courts will not consult
the decade long debate over ANWR oil exploration because the BedRoc
492. Id. The federal government believes that oil drilling in ANWR will be able to produce
10 billion barrels of crude oil annually. See Set America Free Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong.,
§ 2302(l1 )(F) (2005) (stating that ANWR has a mean technically recoverable resource of more
than 10 billion barrels of oil).
493. Arctic Power, Which One is the Real ANWR?,
http://www.anwr.org/backgrnd/theissue.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2005).
494. NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 51
(2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf (last visited
January 8, 2005).
495. Ben Geman, On The Hill-Energy Policy: Domenici Vows Quick Action on ANWR Bill,
ENV'T & ENERGY DAILY, Jan. 5, 2005, art. 2.
496. See supra Part IV (analyzing how the Justices evaluate land grants under BedRoc Ltd.);
Part V.A (describing how legislators should craft statutory language).
497. See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 314 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct.
1587 (2004) (noting the goal of the Roosevelt land grant reforms was to "facilitate development
of both surface and subsurface resources").
498. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 1593 (2004) (discussing how a court will
infer congressional intent).
499. See, e.g., KATHERINE TAYLOR MORSE, THE NATURE OF GOLD: AN ENVIRONMENTAL
HISTORY OF THE KLONDIKE GOLD RUSH (2003).
500. BedRoc Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 1589.
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Ltd. Court requires judicial inquiry to begin and end with consulting the
statutory text, unless that text is considered ambiguous (a high threshold
to overcome).5° '
While significant progress has been made in making ANWR oil
drilling a reality, drilling is still many years off.502 On April 28, 2005,
both houses of Congress passed a joint budget resolution, which for the
first time, contains an allowance for oil drilling on the coastal plain of
ANWR.50 3  This legislation allows the appropriate authorizing
committees to move forward with its legislation.3° 4  Authorization for
ANWR drilling is found in the Energy Policy Act of 2005-a bill that
has passed the House of Representatives and awaits approval in the
Senate.50 5 While the measure seems to have broad support in the House
and in the Bush Administration, its reception in the Senate has generally
not been favorable. 50 6 In fact, members of the oil industry believe that
ANWR drilling will likely be cut from the bill as a compromise in order
to get the rest of the President's energy initiatives passed.50 7 Thus,
501. Id. at 1593. See also supra Part V.A (describing the impact of the BedRoc Ltd. decision
on lawmakers).
502. Seth Linden, Final ANWR Vote Could Have Nothing To Do With Drilling (KTUU2
News-Alaska broadcast Sept. 15, 1999), available at
http://www.ktuu.com/cms/templates/alaska-news/master.asp?articleid= 15021 &zoneid=4 (last
visited Sept. 5, 2005) (discussing the long road ANWR faces legislatively to allow for drilling to
begin).
503. H.R. Con. Res. 95, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted). See also Rose Ragsdale, Congress
Approves Budget Resolution With ANWR Drilling, PETROLEUM NEWS, May 1, 2005, available at
http://www.petroleumnews.com/pnarchpop/050501-04.html (describing the budget resolution as
moving thru the two bodies with "apparent ease" but cautioning that ANWR proponents are not
ready to begin "dancing in the streets."). The House passed the budget resolution by a 214-211
margin while the Senate passed it after lengthy debate 52-47. Id.
504. See generally WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY
PROCESS (CQ Press 2001). Policy initiatives start by determining whether government money is
needed. Id at 41-43. If an initiative will use federal dollars, it must be budgeted. Id. at 42
(indicating this requirement is not based on the Constitution but rather on the political
development of the nation). Generally, once Congress agrees on a Joint Budget Resolution,
authorizing committees then propose legislation that will allow the executive branch to
implement the policy imitative. Id. at 43. Once authorized, the executive branch must then wait
for the money to come from the appropriating committees to actually fund the project. Id. at 44.
Departures from this "typical" process are quite normal as budget resolutions sometimes do not
get passed. Id. at 45 (indicating that only 30% of all federal spending actually goes through the
appropriations process). In cases, additional procedures are required and a continuing resolution
is needed. Id. at 45.
505. H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005). The House passed the measure 249-183 on April 21, 2005.
Roll Call No. 132, 109th Cong. (2005).
506. Joseph Curl, Bush: Act on Energy Bill Now Senate Slates Debate, Vote, WASH. TIMES,
June 15, 2005, at A04.
507. See Rose Ragsdale, Plenty for Alaska in Senate Energy Bill, PETROLEUM NEWS, June 5,
2005, available at http://www.petroleumnews.com/pnarchpop/050605-24.html (last visited June
16, 2005) (noting threats of Senate filibuster as keeping ANWR off the table).
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while BedRoc Ltd. will play a significant role in determining how to
craft the appropriate ANWR drilling permits, it appears that these
permits are still years away.
50 8
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in BedRoc Ltd. that sand and gravel are
not valuable minerals reserved to the government under the Pittman Act
is not one with broad applicability; however, this fact does not mean the
decision has been inconsequential. The decision provided a
methodology for statutory interpretation that, while controversial, has a
universal application that has already been applied in areas as diverse as
immigration deportation procedures and federal income tax treatment.
In the arena of mineral law, the BedRoc Ltd. decision opens the door to
a future challenge of the decision in Western Nuclear, a case with a
much broader application. All of the Supreme Court Justices in BedRoc
Ltd. seriously questioned the Western Nuclear decision but
distinguished BedRoc Ltd. on stare decisis grounds. Thus, the BedRoc
Ltd. decision is a deceptively significant case of which all lawmakers,
judges and attorneys must take notice.
508. Linden, supra note 502.
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